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 This study compares American and Turkish male and female university students 
in terms of moral orientation (justice and care) and Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning 
to examine the influence of culture and gender on moral development. A total of 324 
undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 46 are administered the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) and the Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO). Statistical analyses 
indicate Turkish participants reflect more postconventional reasoning, while American 
participants reflect more conventional reasoning, particularly Stage 4 reasoning. Analyses 
also reveal Turkish participants reflect significantly more care orientation and more 
justice orientation compared to American participants. These findings are discussed in 
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CHAPTER   1
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Gender differences and gender bias are important and controversial issues in moral
theory (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995). Gender difference in moral development can be
defined as the difference in the moral perspectives of man and woman due to the
difference in their rearing, while gender bias in moral development can be defined as the
favoring of one gender’s moral reasoning over the other.
The issue of gender differences in moral functioning has been a discussion subject
for a long time. “Historically, women and men have often been accorded and claimed to
have different moral qualities and, not infrequently, differential moral worth” (Kurtines &
Gewirtz, 1995, p. 23). In ancient ethical texts, “justice was seen as the moral virtue that
organized all other virtues and balanced them in proper, relative proportions” (Puka, 1994,
p. 321). Therefore, up to the 20th century, almost all philosophers saw man as the
competent moral agent in that he acts rationally in the solution of social conflicts by
assuming justice as the basic issue. Conversely, woman was seen as the incompetent
moral agent in that she is unsuccessful in doing so (Walker, 1998).
Contemporary moral development theories also gave priority to realization of
justice in social life. Moral maturity required for applying justice was equated with the
capacity for autonomous thinking, the ability to judge by logical reasoning, and the
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detachment that gives rise to objectivity. Further, these properties were associated with
masculinity, as was the case throughout history. Women’s development was seen as
distinctive and problematic as it did not reflect the standards of men (Gilligan, 1982). The
source of this problem was associated with women’s development being dependent on
the experience of relationships and emotion more than reason, as well as their inability to
abstract from the particularity of situations. Consequently, they were viewed as not being
autonomous and not being able to act impartially in their moral decisions (Hekman,
1995).
For example, according to Freud (as quoted in Gilligan, 1982), “women show
less sense of justice than men that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of
life, that they are more often influenced in their judgment by feelings of affection or
hostility” (p. 7). Similarly, Piaget pointed out (as quoted in Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988)
“the most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main the legal sense is
far less developed in little girls than in boys” (p. 113). In addition, Erikson said the
development of women was different from that of men, but he showed little interest in
defining this difference (Hekman, 1995). Therefore, both pre-20th century philosophers
and contemporary development theoreticians viewed men’s moral reasoning as superior
and mature (Walker, 1998), and saw women’s moral reasoning as inferior, ethically
undeveloped, immature, and childlike (Koehn, 1998).
Gender differences in Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning caused the
emergence of the most salient controversy regarding gender bias in moral theory
(Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995). Kohlberg, who was influenced by ancient ethical texts and
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especially by Piaget’s ideas (Puka, 1994), defended cognition as the foundation of
morality, and separation and objectivity were bases for moral maturity (Eisenberg,
Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1994). Kohlberg’s theory showed the sequence of an
individual’s moral development followed a six-stage progression. Higher stages
represented moral maturity, in other words, justice reasoning. Kohlberg, for long years,
studied both women’s and men’s progressions in these stages and statistically
concluded more women reasoned at lower stages compared to men  (Held, 1993). In
other words, he found men to be more morally advanced with respect to women
(Gilligan, 1995).
Gilligan (1982) opposed these findings about women and Kohlberg’s
interpretation of them. According to Gilligan, women’s lives and experiences are
distinct from men’s, and the moral voices of two sexes spring from separate
developmental sources. Therefore, women experience a moral development different
from but parallel to that of men (Meyers & Kittay, 1987). Women value behavior and
emotions such as caring for others, having interdependent relationships, being
responsive to the needs of others, sympathy, compassion, and love, which do not
constitute a basis for traditional moral development theories. Consequently, they give
preference to such behavior and emotions in moral issues, instead of justice (Gilligan).
According to Gilligan (1982), traditional developmental theoreticians,
especially Piaget and Kohlberg, ignored this distinction in woman’s development, and
they tried to observe the woman from the perspective of male life in adult development.
In other words, these theoreticians built their moral theories on the norms of
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masculinity. Therefore, the woman who has different social and moral development is
seen as a “failure” in terms of development by these theoreticians who consider male
norms, such as independence and autonomy, as mature adult standards.
Gilligan (1982) believed these theories were inadequate, male-biased, and
incomplete as they did not include women’s experiences. Thus, Kohlberg’s stages of
moral reasoning did not adequately reflect the morality of girls and women. His theory
and scoring system measured only justice reasoning and did not represent the
characteristically feminine concerns for caring and responsiveness (Walker, 1994).
Because women use care reasoning as the guide for moral decisions, it was normal for
them not to score highly in measurement instruments designed for measuring justice
reasoning. But, this did not mean woman was morally less advanced (Gilligan).
The discussion between Kohlberg and Gilligan on cognition-emotion has drawn
attention to moral emotions (Eisenberg et al., 1994), and research on this subject
flourished after the 1980s (Shweder & Haidt, 1994).
Women and men live, to some extent, in different social environments. They
experience different social expectations and different opportunities (Gilligan, 1982).
According to cognitive developmental theories, moral development depends on
experience (Gardner, 1983). If so, can different moralities develop from different
experiences? Researchers sought an answer to this question by providing an overview
of theory and research regarding the issue of sexism in moral psychology. As pointed
out by Walker (1995), “at the center of the contemporary controversy regarding sex
differences and sex bias have been the theories of Gilligan and Kohlberg” (p. 83).
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Therefore, moral development researchers focused their studies especially on
Kohlberg’s research to investigate if “gender bias in favor of males” existed in his
theory, as Gilligan claimed.
Even though Gilligan states that race and culture also influence moral
reasoning, she claims justice and care orientations are basically linked to gender
(Hekman, 1995). However, many researchers believe “Gilligan insightfully identified a
missing voice in Kohlberg’s theory, but inappropriately primarily linked it to gender
rather than culture” (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995, p. 24). According to Miller (as cited in
Turiel, 1998), “variations in judgments about interpersonal obligations and justice
reflect cultural, and not gender, differences” (Turiel, 1998, p. 895).
Based on the existing literature, this study is an attempt to assess the
significance of cultural and gender differences on moral development. To test the
influence of culture and gender on moral development, the Defining Issues Test (DIT)
(Rest, 1986) and the Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) (Liddell, Halpin, & Halpin,
1992) are applied to both male and female from the U.S. and Turkey. The DIT provides
a quantitative assessment of a participant’s probabilistic usage of each of Kohlberg’s
stages 1 through 6 (Ma & Cheung, 1996). The MMO, on the other hand, measures a
participant’s moral orientations for care as stressed by Gilligan, or justice as stressed by
Kohlberg (Liddell et al.). In this research, DIT score differences between male and
female populations are compared to the DIT score differences between Turkish and
U.S. populations to assess the significance of cultural and gender differences on moral
reasoning, and MMO score differences between male and female populations are
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compared to MMO score differences between Turkish and U.S. populations to assess
the significance of cultural and gender differences on moral orientation.
This thesis has 4 chapters. In Chapter 1, Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s moral
theories will be reviewed in detail and research findings and criticisms on their
fundamental theses will be summarized. Next in Chapter 1 is brief information on the
social structure and gender equality in Turkey. This information on social structure and
gender is needed to analyze the results of this study. Purpose of the study and listing of
the hypotheses conclude Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, the details on the Turkish and U.S.
samples are given together with the details of the instruments used in this research. In
Chapter 3, the findings of this cross-cultural study will be reported. In Chapter 4, the
results of this study will be discussed and compared to existing research summarized in
Chapter 1.
Review of the Literature
Definition of Terms
Moral Judgment: “deciding which of the possible actions is most moral. The individual
weighs the choices and determines what a person ought to do in such a situation”
(Narvaez & Rest, 1995, p. 386).
P-score: The percentage of a participant’s overall moral reasoning which represents
postconventional reasoning (Stages 5A, 5B, and 6, combined) as defined by Kohlberg’s
theory (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994).
The Ethic of Justice: treating “people fairly by identifying and fulfilling rules,
principles, rights, and duties” (Liddell et al., 1992, p. 326)
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The Ethic of Care: responding “to people in a way that ensures that the least harm will
be done and that no one will be left alone” (Liddell et al., 1992, p. 326)
Moral Orientation: preference for justice- or care-oriented moral reasoning (Yacker &
Weinberg, 1990)
Kohlberg’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory Of Moralization
Moral psychology, through empirical studies, attempts to define what moral
development is and moral philosophy tries to explain what moral development ideally
ought to be (Kohlberg, 1982). Kohlberg is one of the very few psychologists who
combined work in moral psychology and moral philosophy (Kutnick, 1986). In fact, he
integrated psychology, philosophy, and educational practice to establish a
comprehensive explanation of moral growth and a model for moral education (Hersh,
Miller, & Fielding, 1980). He was greatly influenced by the cognitive revolution in
developmental psychology which took place in the 1960s, and carried this revolution to
moral development literature (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995).
Cognitive developmental theories concentrate on the reasoning presumed to
underlie morality. They are interested in the qualitative form of the individual’s moral
reasoning and in developmental changes in that reasoning (Colby, Kohlberg, &
Kauffman, 1987). Following Piaget, they try to uncover stages in the development of
moral understanding. The main contribution of Kohlberg has been to apply the concept
of stage to the development of moral judgment (Hersh, 1979). It can be said that
Kohlberg pioneered the field of moral development, and his theory shaped the field as it
evolved (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995).
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Mature Moral Judgment
A value is a “concept about what someone thinks is important in life” (Fraenkel,
1977, p. 6). Morality can be thought of in terms of the values acquired from the social
environment. Therefore, an individual can be seen as having values, and a moral person
is expected to act on these values. What happens when a person’s values conflict with
one another? How does s/he decide which value to follow? Kohlberg was interested in
the moral issue which takes such questions into consideration and which involves
individuals’ exercising their moral judgments (Hersh, 1979).
For example, what should a woman who believes abortion is wrong, but who is
having an unwanted pregnancy, do? In her state, the law is in favor of abortion.
Similarly, her feminist friends encourage her to control her own life and have the
abortion. Her spouse tends to favor the abortion for certain reasons; however, her
parents think she should not have an abortion for nonmedical reasons. In this case, the
woman is subject to contradictory opinions based on different values. How is she going
to decide what to do? According to cognitive moral development theorists, she has to
choose between these two rights in order to come to a moral decision: (a) the right of
the fetus to life, or (b) the right which leads to her own happiness and welfare (Hersh,
1979).
Based on his studies in the U.S. and in other cultures, Kohlberg (1976)
concluded there were 11 basic moral values found in every society: “laws and rules;
conscience; personal roles of affection; authority; civil rights; contract, trust, and justice
in exchange; punishment and justice; the value of life; property rights and values; truth;
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sex and sexual love” (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 43). According to Kohlberg, when a person
faces a moral dilemma which includes a conflict between such moral values, s/he has to
weigh the competing claims of these values and decide which value ought to take
precedence. For example, what value ought to take precedence over the preservation of
human life? Should law take precedence? Should an individual break a law to protect a
life? Should property take precedence? Should an individual sacrifice her/his property
to protect someone’s life? Should conscience take precedence? Should an individual
sacrifice a point of conscience (e.g., displaying violence) to preserve a life? Should
roles of affection take precedence? Should an individual sacrifice her/his close
relationship with an old friend to save a life? Should contract take precedence? Should
an individual save a person’s life with whom s/he has no contract of mutual
responsibility (Hersh, 1979)?
       Kohlberg claims that as a person’s moral judgment grows more
       adequate, he will be able to differentiate the value of life from all
       other values and see that it should take precedence over them. He
       will also see that saving a person’s life is what ought to be done,
       independent of whether he feels like it or whether other people
       would be likely to do the same. (Hersh, 1979, p. 91)
According to Kohlberg, as the mature moral thinkers respect human life, they
support individual rights, and base their moral decisions upon a concept of justice (Rich
& DeVitis, 1985).
10
The Prerequisites of Moral Judgment
Cognitive Development
As mentioned before, the cognitive developmental tradition played an important
role in the emergence of the moral development field (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995).
Piaget and other cognitive developmental theorists believe infants’ and children’s
understanding is different from adults’. Children are not yet able to perceive and
organize experiences as an adult. Instead, they move through a series of developmental
stages until they reach the highest level of functioning (Sugarman, 1987).
After the child learns to speak, s/he passes through 3 major stages of reasoning:
the preoperational, the concrete operational, and the formal operational (Kohlberg,
1982). In each stage, the individual interprets and responds to her/his environment in a
qualitatively different way. In the preoperational stage (2-7 years), young children’s
mental actions do not obey logical rules. Their understanding is perception-bound, their
thinking is centered, and their focus is on states rather than transformations. They
cannot establish a cause and effect relation. They believe other people perceive, think,
and feel the same way they do. In the concrete operational stage (7-11 years), children
can classify things, look at situations from different perspectives, see quantitative
relations about concrete things, and make logical inferences. However, they can only
reason logically about concrete, tangible information, not about abstract information. In
the formal operational stage (11 years and older), young people can reason abstractly
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and use hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Therefore, when faced with a problem, they
can think of all possibilities, form hypotheses, and test them in an orderly fashion
against reality (Sugarman, 1987).
 According to Kohlberg, the exercise of moral judgment is a cognitive process
that allows individuals to reflect on their values and organize them into a logical order.
As mentioned before, the most advanced moral reasoners believe the value of life and
the equality of human rights take precedence over all other values (Hersh, 1979), and
they try to resolve conflicts in ways that would result in justice (Koehn, 1998).
Kohlberg (1976) points out advanced moral reasoning depends on advanced logical
reasoning. Therefore, mature moral judgment, which represents justice reasoning,
requires full formal operational reasoning as a base.
The Development of Perspective-Taking
Kohlberg defines moral judgment as the weighing of one’s own claim against
the other’s. The individual can weigh her/his own claim against the other’s only if s/he
can take the other’s perspective and understand the other’s claim (Hersh, 1979).
Therefore, according to Kohlberg (1976), the development of moral judgment depends
on the advances in perspective (role) taking skills as well as on cognitive development.
Moral growth occurs when the individual becomes aware of perspectives beyond the
immediate self (Galbraith & Jones, 1976).
Perspective-taking skills develop gradually from about the age of 6 (Hersh,
1979). As the child becomes cognitively mature, s/he also becomes better able to
perceive and combine various points of view regarding a moral conflict and to consider
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more of the relevant situational factors (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1987).
Therefore, each new cognitive stage improves the individual’s role-taking capacity and
moves her/him closer to basing moral decisions upon a concept of justice (Rich &
DeVitis, 1985).
For example, a person whose cognitive stage is only preoperational is limited to
moral stage 1 as s/he cannot yet distinguish the perspectives of others from her/his own.
S/he sees only her/his own perspective. A person whose cognitive stage is concrete
operational is limited to moral stage 2. S/he has the capacity to view her/his own
thoughts, feelings, and behavior from the other person’s perspective. S/he also
recognizes that others can do the same. Thus, s/he can predict how other people will
react to her/his behaviors and can plan her/his actions accordingly. A person whose
cognitive stage is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral
stages (Stages 3 and 4). The individual, in the early formal operational stage, can step
outside a two-person situation and view the interaction from the point of view of a
third, impartial party. Taking a third-party perspective is crucial for the development of
moral judgment as it allows the individual to understand how the group will react to
her/his dealings with others. Only the people who have full formal reasoning can
display postconventional reasoning (Stages 5 and 6). Postconventional reasoners
recognize third-party perspective taking can be affected by larger societal values and
mutual perspective-taking does not always result in complete understanding (Hersh,
1979). In a moral conflict situation, they can put themselves in the place of the various
people involved and truly understand their claims and interests. Consequently, they can
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generate moral judgments on which all rational men involved in sociomoral action
could ideally agree, and their decisions are recognized as fair by all the conflicting
people involved (Kohlberg, 1994).
Kohlberg (as cited in Turiel, 1998) views the child as a moral philosopher.
According to him,
     children form ways of thinking through their social experiences
     which include substantive understandings of moral concepts like
     justice, rights, equality, and welfare. An implicit but important
     assumption in this formulation is that morality is not solely, or even
     mainly, imposed on children nor solely based on avoiding negative
     emotions like anxiety and guilt. As part of their orientation to social
     relationships, and especially through taking the perspectives of others
                 children generate judgments, built on emotions like sympathy, empathy,
     respect, love, and attachment, to which they have a commitment and
     which are not in conflict with their natural or biological dispositions.
     (Turiel, 1998, p. 867)
Kohlberg’s Research Technique
Kohlberg (1976), for long years, studied how people think about social and
moral problems. He started his research with the assumption that people restructure
their reasoning about moral situations just as they develop their cognitive (logical)
structure from concrete reasoning toward one more abstract in nature (Galbraith &
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Jones, 1976). Then, he interviewed 72 middle-class and lower-class American boys
(ages 10, 13, and 16) in suburban Chicago to study the development of moral reasoning
(Hersh, 1979).
His Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) consists of 3 hypothetical dilemmas. In
each dilemma, a character who is in a difficult situation is expected to choose between
two conflicting values. Each dilemma is read to the participant and several probing
questions are presented. More specifically, the participant is asked how the main
character ought to solve the dilemma “and why that would be the right way to act in
this situation” (Hersh, 1979, p. 54). Each dilemma includes a different moral issue. One
of the dilemmas in Kohlberg’s MJI is as follows:
     In Europe, a woman is near death from a special kind of cancer. There
     is one drug that the doctors think might save her. It is a form of radium
     that a druggist in the same town has recently discovered. The drug is
     expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the drug
     cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and is charging $2000
     for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, goes to
     everyone he knows to borrow the money, but he can get together only
     about $1000 which is half of what it costs. He tells the druggist that his
     wife is dying and asks him to sell the drug cheaper or let him pay later.
     The druggist says, “No, I discovered the drug and I am going to make
     money from it.” Heinz is desperate and considers breaking into the man’s
     store to steal the drug for his wife.
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          1.   Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?
2. If Heinz doesn’t love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?
                      Why or why not?
3. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should
Heinz steal the drug for a stranger? Why or why not?
4. [If you favor stealing the drug for a stranger]: Suppose it is a pet
animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? Why
or why not?
5. Why should people do everything they can to save another’s life,
anyhow?
6. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally
wrong? Why or why not?
7. Why should people generally do everything they can to avoid
breaking the law, anyhow?
    7a.   How does this relate to Heinz’s case? (Hersh, 1979, p. 54-55)
In this dilemma, the competing issues are life and law (Lapsley, 1996). In other
words, the participant is expected to choose between the value of preserving life and the
value of upholding the law. The probing questions are designed to elicit the
participant’s understanding of these two issues. The researcher is not interested in if the
participant thinks Heinz should or should not steal the drug. Instead, s/he focuses on the
participant’s reasons for choosing one value over the other. In the second dilemma, the
conflicting values are conscience (e.g., whether to forgive a person who broke the law
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out of conscience) and punishment (e.g., whether to punish a person who broke the
law). The third dilemma focuses on an issue including a conflict between authority
(e.g., obeying one’s parent) and the importance of promise-keeping and contract (e.g.,
abiding to an agreement). The participant’s consistent reasoning across a range of moral
dilemmas determines her/his level of moral judgment (Hersh, 1979).
On the basis of American boys’ responses to these hypothetical moral
dilemmas, Kohlberg specified six developmental types of value orientations:
“obedience and punishment; naively egoistic; good boy; authority and social-order
maintaining; contractual legalistic; conscience or principles” (Kurtines & Greif, 1974,
p. 270). These types constituted the basis for the six stages of moral judgment.
Levels and Stages of Moral Judgment
Kohlberg (1976) divided the 6 stages of moral judgment into 3 levels:
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. These 3 levels represent 3
different ways of relating the self to society’s moral expectations (Lapsley, 1996).
There are two stages in each level. “The second stage is a more advanced and organized
form of the general perspective of each major level” (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33). Each
stage has a different and more comprehensive perspective on society, right action, and
the concept of justice (Hersh et al., 1980).
Preconventional Level
Individuals in this level approach a moral problem from the perspective of the
concrete interests of the people involved in a situation. Therefore, they judge actions by
their consequences. Behaviors that cause punishment are seen as bad, whereas those
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that result in rewards are viewed as good (Hersh, 1979). The preconventional level is
characteristic of young children under 9, some adolescents, and criminal offenders
(Kohlberg, 1976).
Stage 1: heteronomous morality
Individuals in this stage have an egocentric point of view. They do not
recognize others can have interests or perspectives which are different from theirs
(Kohlberg, 1976). Moral rules and norms are seen as something imposed by authority
figures, not something that is constructed from the inside. The moral significance of
authority figures is defined physicalistically. Individuals in this stage think people who
are rich, big, and famous have more valid claims to justice and greater moral authority
than people who are poor, small, and not famous. Stage 1 individuals behave morally
because they know they will be punished if they break the rules (Lapsley, 1996).
Stage 2: individualistic, instrumental morality
Individuals in this stage have a concrete individualistic perspective. They
understand everybody has different interests to pursue and these conflict. Therefore,
right is seen as relative (Kohlberg, 1976). Stage 2 reasoners obey the rules as long as it
is to their own immediate interest. In this stage, reciprocity is not yet a matter of
loyalty, gratitude, or justice (Kohlberg, 1994). It is seen as a way to satisfy personal
needs (e.g., “If you help me, I’ll help you”). Thus, justice is viewed as equal exchange
of favors (Lapsley, 1996). Right action is defined as satisfying personal needs (without
unduly harming anybody else) and as letting others do likewise (Walker, 1994).
18
Conventional Level
In the conventional level, the self is identified with the rules of others,
especially those of authority figures (Hersh, 1979). The conventional level represents a
rule-maintaining orientation, whatever the rules may be (Rest, 1997). Morality is
viewed as behaving according to what society defines as right. Therefore, individuals in
this level approach a moral issue from a member-of-society perspective (Hersh). They
continue to conform to cultural norms and rules, but not for reasons of self-interest.
They believe they should keep the current social system to ensure positive human
relationships and societal order. For this reason, they see norms and conventions as
necessary to uphold society. The conventional level is characteristic of most
adolescents and adults (Kohlberg, 1976).
Stage 3: interpersonal normative morality
In this stage individuals have the informal group perspective as they take the
perspective of people close to them (e.g., family, peer groups, relatives). They are
aware of the shared feelings, agreements, and expectations, and those shared feelings
take primacy over their own individual interests (Locke, 1994). Moral choices depend
on close ties to others (Kohlberg, 1994). Stage 3 reasoners display good behavior to be
able to keep the affection and approval of friends and relatives. Therefore, right action
is viewed as playing a good role, caring for other people, and meeting others’
expectations (Locke). Intentions become important for the first time in judging
behaviors (Kohlberg).
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Stage 4: social system morality
At this stage, individuals have a formal group perspective. In other words, they
consider the generalized social system perspective. They obey the law in order to
ensure social order and maintain the welfare of society (Walker, 1994). Stage 4
reasoners define right behavior as doing one’s duty, showing respect for authority, and
keeping the social order for its own sake (Kohlberg, 1994).
Postconventional Level
Postconventional individuals approach a moral issue from a prior-to-society
perspective (Hersh, 1979). Postconventional reasoners, like individuals at the
conventional level, also want to be a responsible member of society, but have a
perspective for rule-making – a vision for how social order should optimize human
welfare and enhance cooperation (Rest, 1997). They define morality in terms of self-
chosen principles rooted in the concept of justice. This level is the rarest and usually
attained after the age of 20 (Kohlberg, 1976).
Stage 5: human rights and social welfare morality
Stage 5 reasoners are aware individuals have a variety of values and opinions,
and they recognize most values and rules are relative to their own group. They uphold
these rules and values as they constitute the social contract. They believe such
nonrelative values and rights as life and liberty, however, should be upheld in any
society regardless of majority opinion (Niemczynski, Czyzowska, Pourkos, & Mirski,
1994). Stage 5 individuals have both moral and legal points of view, and they know
these two points of view sometimes conflict (Kohlberg, 1976). They follow laws when
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they are consistent with human rights. When the existing laws are questionable, they
emphasize fair procedures for changing the law (Kohlberg, 1994). However, their
moral perspective is not independent of the perspective behind contractual-legal rights
(Kohlberg, 1976).
Stage 6: universal ethical principles
In this stage, “right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-
chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency” (Kohlberg, 1994, p. 4). Stage 6 reasoners base their decisions on
principles of universal justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity
of individuals (Kohlberg, 1976).
To summarize, in Kohlberg’s (1981) theory, morality shifts away from concrete,
externally controlled reasoning toward more abstract, principled justifications for moral
choices from late childhood into adulthood. According to Kohlberg, the structure of
thought is the primary consideration for determining an individual’s moral progress;
however, at the highest two stages content is also relevant. In other words, at the
highest two stages moral reasoning and content are integrated into a coherent ethical
system. Therefore, morally mature individuals not only agree on “why” certain actions
are justified, but also agree on “what people should do” when faced with a moral
dilemma.
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Invariant Sequence of Stages
Kohlberg’s Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males
According to Kohlberg (1981), the stages progress in an invariant sequence. In
other words, individuals pass through the stages in the prescribed order. As mentioned
before, Kohlberg started his empirical research by interviewing a group of American
boys. On the basis of their responses to a series of hypothetical dilemmas, he initially
identified six stages in the development of moral judgment. This study was cross-
sectional; in other words, participants were interviewed only once, and age trends were
found by comparing boys of different ages. Kohlberg realized, however, that to be able
to prove his assumption of the invariant sequence of stages, he would have to interview
the same participants over time to find out if each participant passed through the stages
in the same order (Hersh, 1979).
Motivated by this belief, Kohlberg interviewed 50 of the boys who participated
in his original study at regular 3—4-year intervals for 20 years. Half of the participants
was upper middle-class and half was lower middle and working-class. Kohlberg
interpreted the results of this research as consistent with the stage model of
development. In fact, his study showed no participant reached a stage without having
passed through each preceding stage. In other words, there was no evidence of stage
skipping. The level of moral maturity consistently increased with increasing age. In
fact, most 10-year-old participants were observed to be at Stage 1/2 or 2. Most early
adolescents (13-14) were at Stage 2/3. Half of the late adolescents was found to be at
Stage 3. Participants in their early 20s were either in transition between Stages 3 and 4
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or still at Stage 3. Most participants between the mid-20s and mid-30s displayed Stage
3/4 mixtures, “with decreasing numbers at Stage 3 and increasing numbers at
consolidated Stage 4” (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1987, p. 101). There was
no evidence of Stage 5 until age 24 (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.).
Social class was observed to be important, especially in the development of
Stages 4 and 5. Results showed more middle-class participants attained both Stage 4
and the postconventional 4/5 level compared to working-class participants. Social class
differences in rate of moral development were attributed to “differential participation in
and identification with the society and its secondary institutions” (Colby, Kohlberg,
Gibbs, et al., 1987, p. 113). It has been stated this differential participation provides
differential perspective-taking opportunities for children from middle and working
classes. Middle-class children experience being integral participants in the society and,
therefore, obtain the generalized social system perspective which represents Stage 4
(Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.).
The correlation between moral judgment stage and education was moderate (r =
.54). No participant attained Stage 4 without having attended some college, and none of
the participants obtained the 4/5 level without having completed college. According to
Kohlberg, this finding does not mean that college experience is always required for the
development of Stage 4 or Stage 5; however, the correlation implies educational
experience stimulates the development of higher stages (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.,
1987).
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Based on his longitudinal research in U.S. males, Kohlberg asserted the results
provided strong support for the central assumptions of his theory (Colby, Kohlberg,
Gibbs, et al., 1987).
Kohlberg’s Studies in Other Cultures
Kohlberg believes “stage sequences are not only invariant across individuals
within a particular culture or subculture but are also culturally universal” (Colby,
Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1987, p. 9). Cultural relativists, on the other hand, view
morality as a concept relative to the culture. They believe moral values and behaviors
differ from society to society (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994). Kohlberg acknowledges
there is moral diversity among cultures. However, according to him, “the differences lie
in the stage of moral development of individuals and cultures and in the meaning, use,
and hierarchical ordering of value concepts. These cultural divergencies are not only
found in the knowledge base but in the principles used in moral evaluations” (Rich &
DeVitis, 1985, p. 93). Even so, individuals in every society, Kohlberg asserts, pass
through the same sequence of moral development as all cultures use the same basic
moral concepts or principles (Rich & DeVitis). “Cultural factors may speed up, slow
down, or stop development, but they do not change its sequence” (Colby, Kohlberg, &
Kauffman, 1987, p. 6).
To establish the cross-cultural validity of his moral stage theory, Kohlberg
conducted studies examining the development of moral reasoning in children and
adolescents in Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico. Only the studies in Turkey and
Israel were longitudinal (Hersh, 1979).
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Kohlberg’s Longitudinal Study in Turkish Males
In Turkey, data were collected from male participants (n = 109) in three
locations: a rural village, a seaport provincial capital, and the national capital.
Participants from the village consisted of students in the local school, young workers,
and young men who had recently finished their military service. Participants from the
cities included elementary school, high school, and college students or young workers.
All city participants were middle-class. Participants (ages 10 to 28) were interviewed in
1964, 1966, 1970, and 1976. The results indicated a sequential advance with age
through the stages of moral reasoning. There was no evidence of stage skipping (Nisan
& Kohlberg, 1982).
Participants under 18 years of age tended to display a mixed rather than a pure
stage. After this age, however, participants, especially village boys (56.3%), showed a
tendency to stabilize at Stage 3. Only 35% of the city participants older than 18 showed
pure Stage 3 responses. Additionally, 45% of the city participants in the oldest age
group displayed Stage 4 development, whereas only 12.5% of the village participants in
the same age group showed any sign of Stage 4 reasoning (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982).
Among the college students there was a sizable usage of Stage 5 judgment (Turiel,
Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978). Nisan and Kohlberg concluded the rate of moral
judgment development was slower in the village than in the city.
Kohlberg’s Longitudinal Study in Kibbutz Adolescents
The Israeli sample came from a Kibbutz community, an intentionally created,
highly integrated society reflecting a socialist-collectivist ideology (Gielen, 1996). The
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sample included both Kibbutz-born and Middle Eastern Israeli adolescents and adults
(78 males and 56 females – ages 12 to 26). The results showed change in moral
reasoning was consecutive, gradual, and upward. No participant skipped a stage. The
level of moral reasoning consistently increased with increasing age. The Kibbutz mean
stage scores at all ages were found to be higher than the mean stage scores in the U.S.
and Turkey. There were no significant sex differences in stage scores (Colby, Kohlberg,
Snarey, & Reimer, 1987).
Kohlberg’s Studies in Taiwan and Mexico
Kohlberg studied boys between 10 and 16 years of age in Taiwan and Mexico
and in an isolated village in the Yucatan. The development of middle-class boys from
cities in Taiwan and Mexico was similar to that of American middle-class boys from
ages 10 to 16. Taiwanese and Mexicans were observed to use Stage 1 at age 10;
however, by age 16 they, too, displayed conventional moral reasoning predominantly.
The development of village boys in the Yucatan reflected the same sequence of stages;
however, their rate of development was much slower. Yucatan boys, like village boys
in Turkey, tended to stabilize at Stage 3 (Hersh, 1979).
 According to Kohlberg, the results of the studies in Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, and
Mexico were consistent with the structural understanding of the development of moral
judgment and provided strong evidence for his theory’s universality claim. Stages 4/5
and 5, however, were relatively rare and none of the village participants in Turkey and
Yucatan reached Stage 5 (Colby, Kohlberg, Snarey, et al., 1987).
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Research Findings on Kohlberg’s Fundamental Theses
Invariant Sequence
Research Findings in the U.S.
In the 1960s and 1970s, many studies were conducted in the U.S. to test
Kohlberg’s hypothesis of the invariant sequence, and most of these studies yielded
support. For example, Denney and Duffy (1974) investigated the environmental causes
of stages in moral judgment in 6-year-old, 10-year-old, and 14-year-old children. As a
result of their study, they observed that as the age of the children increased, the level of
moral judgment used by children also increased. Participants did not display stage
skipping. In 1989 Walker (as cited in Walker, 1996) did a 2-year longitudinal study
with 233 children, adolescents, and adults. There was no evidence of stage skipping.
Cross-Cultural Findings
Today, there are more than 120 cross-cultural studies available conducted to
evaluate Kohlberg’s claim of cultural universality. These studies especially relied on
two methods: Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and Rest’s Defining Issues
Test (DIT) (Gielen, 1996). The MJI was widely used, and the reliability and validity of
the MJI were demonstrated to be very good. However, its scoring system was found to
be quite complicated. Rest’s Defining Issues Test is a more accessible measure in
comparison with the MJI (Walker, 1996). For this reason, it is the most frequently used
moral judgment measure in the moral development literature (Gielen).
As mentioned before, the MJI is a production test designed to elicit participants’
best reasoning. The DIT, on the other hand, is a recognition-preference test that aims to
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learn respondents’ evaluation on moral arguments (Gielen, 1996). The MJI is interested
in the qualitative assessment of the structure of moral reasoning, while the DIT is more
interested in the quantitative assessment of a participant’s probabilistic usage of each of
Stages 1 through 6 (Ma & Cheung, 1996).
The DIT studies constitute the primary focus of this thesis. However, in order to
assess how the DIT results can be related to the MJI results, brief information on cross-
cultural studies using the MJI will also be presented. Snarey (1985), Moon (1986), and
Gielen and Markoulis (1994) reviewed cross-cultural studies conducted to test
Kohlberg’s claim of cultural universality. Their reviews can be summarized as follows:
Snarey’s Review
Snarey (1985) reviewed 45 cross-cultural studies (including Kohlberg’s studies)
completed in 27 different cultures. These studies were conducted using Kohlberg’s
Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). Longitudinal research results came from the
following countries: Bahamas, Canada, India, Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, and the U.S.
Cross-sectional studies were carried out in the following countries: Bahamas, Canada,
England, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Israel,
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, New Guinea, Pakistan, Puerto Rico,
Taiwan, Thailand, U.S., Yucatan, and Zambia.
As a result of his review, Snarey (1985) concluded the Moral Judgment Scale
used in all cross-cultural studies was reasonably culture fair as dilemmas reflected the
local culture and most participants were interviewed in their native language. His
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review showed there was no stage skipping in both cross-sectional and longitudinal
studies. The modal stage and the upper limits of the stage range increased with
increasing age.
Stages 1 to 4 were virtually universal; however, there was little evidence of
Stages 5 and 6. Stage 4/5 or 5 was commonly present when age was controlled. A total
of 100% of the urban Western samples and 91% of the urban non-Western societies
displayed Stage 4/5 or Stage 5 reasoning. However, these stages were absent in village
folk societies, both Western and non-Western (Snarey, 1985). For example, consistent
with Kohlberg’s observations in a Turkish village, Edwards (1986), in her Kenyan
study, also observed adults who had never left their villages used primarily Stage 2 and
Stage 3 moral judgments, while adults who had high-school education displayed some
Stage 4 judgment. Adults who had university-level education, on the other hand,
displayed Stage 4 and Stage 5 judgments. According to Edwards, Stage 3 is a sufficient
level of reasoning in communities having face-to-face relationships. This situation does
not necessitate differentiation and integration beyond Stage 3. Based on the general
findings of these 45 studies, Snarey suggested the significant difference lay not between
Western versus non-Western societies, but between folk versus urban societies.
In all studies the level of moral reasoning increased with increasing age and
education, consistent with Kohlberg’s findings. Upper middle or middle-class
participants were higher in the level of moral reasoning with respect to lower-class or
working-class participants (Snarey, 1985). As the MJI was developed primarily based
upon longitudinal data from the U.S., researchers might expect especially high maturity
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scores for U.S. groups. However, in comparison with the scores of the other samples,
the American moral maturity scores were about average (Gielen, 1996). The data from
three collectivistic cultures—Taiwan, Israeli Kibbutz, and India—showed the samples
from these countries scored higher than even upper middle-class Americans in one or
more age divisions, and Turkish urban participants ranked higher than working-class
participants in the U.S (Snarey).
Among the groups of younger participants, the Chinese samples received the
highest moral judgment scores. In other words, Chinese children displayed
conventional moral reasoning at a much earlier age compared to their age peers
(Gielen, 1996). Stage 4 first appeared among 4 Taiwanese high-school students.
Similarly, Stage 4/5 was first observed in an 18-year-old Taiwanese adolescent (Snarey,
1985).
Based on his review, Snarey (1985) concluded findings of studies in these
widely differing societies strongly supported the existence and invariant sequence of
Kohlberg’s moral stages.
Moon’s Review
In 1986 Moon reviewed 20 cross-cultural studies completed in 15 countries:
Australia, Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Trinidad and Tobago. These
studies were conducted using the DIT (usually a translated version of the DIT).
As a result of his review, Moon (1986) observed samples reflecting the
characteristics of American culture received the highest P-scores. In fact, American
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participants’ P-scores were higher than their counterparts in Mexico, Japan, and Saudi
Arabia. Similarly, English adolescents scored higher P-scores than their Greek age-
mates. There was a strong positive relationship between the P-score and age/education
in various cross-cultural studies. However, the rate of development was different for the
Western (Americans) and non-Western participants (Koreans and Chinese). The DIT
studies indicated the older and better educated the non-Western participants were, the
more they lagged behind their American counterparts. The Eastern participants’ P-
scores were either higher or close to those of their American age-mates in their junior
high school years. However, as they got older and more educated, the increase in their
P-scores slowed down. In general, education was observed to be more important than
chronological age in the development of moral reasoning.
Based on these studies, Moon (1986) concluded the cross-cultural results were
similar to American findings and Kohlbergian findings and, therefore, the DIT had
cross-cultural validity in identifying moral reasoning structures and their development
in other cultures.
Gielen and Markoulis’s Review
Gielen and Markoulis (1994) reviewed 15 studies employing the DIT in 14
different cultures. The data were taken from the following populations: Australia,
Ireland, USA, Greece, Poland, Belize, Trinidad-Tobago, Hong Kong, South Korea,
Taiwan, Sudan, Kuwait, Egypt, and Nigeria.
Gielen and Markoulis’s (1994) review showed in all studies not completed in
Arab countries P-scores consistently increased with increasing age and education level.
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The older and better educated participants supported the postconventional arguments
more frequently than the younger and less educated participants. Among high school
participants, the highest scores were reported for Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong
Kong, a finding consistent with Lei’s result that younger students from Taiwan scored
unusually high on the MJI. North American, European, and the East Asian college and
university students received similar P-scores. Participants from less developed
countries such as Belize, Nigeria, and Trinidad-Tobago scored lower than participants
from the more industrialized nations in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Based
on this finding, Gielen and Markoulis suggested the significant difference lay between
industrialized Western or East Asian countries with better educational systems and less
industrialized countries with less educational opportunities, not between Western,
Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking countries and non-Western, non-English-speaking
countries.
According to Gielen and Markoulis (1994), their review demonstrated
Kohlberg’s stages were universal. In other words, the researchers argued the
understanding of and the preference for postconventional moral reasoning seemed to
develop in East Asian, European, and North American cultures. However, studies in
Egypt, Kuwait, and Sudan did not show clear developmental trends. The majority of
participants from these countries did not pass the standard consistency tests included in
the DIT. Furthermore, the samples did not show a significant correlation between P-
scores and age/education. Therefore, according to Gielen and Markoulis, the DIT might
not be a satisfactory measure of moral judgment for Arab societies.
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Relations Among Cognitive, Role-Taking, and Moral Development
Kohlberg (1976) claims “just as there is a vertical sequence of steps in
movement up from moral stage 1 to moral stage 2 to moral stage 3, so there is a
horizontal sequence of steps in movement from logic to social perception to moral
judgment” (p. 32).
Researchers found results supporting Kohlberg’s assumption about dependent
relations among the logical, social-cognitive, and moral domains (Lapsley, 1996). For
example, Walker and Richards (as cited in Lapsley) observed participants did not reach
moral Stage 4 without obtaining “early basic” formal operations as a prerequisite.
Selman (1971) investigated the relationship between role-taking skill and moral
judgment in middle childhood. He applied Kohlberg’s moral judgment measure, two
role-taking tasks, and the PPV Test to 60 middle-class children. As a result of his study,
he observed reciprocal role-taking was a necessary condition for the development of
conventional moral judgment. Similarly, in 1980 Walker (as cited in Walker, 1996)
applied measures of cognitive, perspective-taking, and moral reasoning development to
a group of children. Results showed most children were more advanced in cognitive
and perspective-taking development than in moral development, and only less than 2%
displayed higher maturity in moral development than in the other domains. In the same
study Walker, through an experimental intervention, tried to force moral reasoning
development as a function of attainment of prerequisites in both cognitive and role-
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taking domains. His intervention resulted in stimulating moral development to the next
stage only for those children who obtained the cognitive and perspective-taking
prerequisites.
The Structure of Moral Judgment
Kohlberg (1981) states that not the decisions but the reasons underlying these
decisions are important in resolving moral problems. Therefore, his focus is on the
structure of moral judgment (general organizing principles of thought) rather than
specific moral beliefs. In other words, he is interested in the form of reasoning rather
than the specific and culturally variable content of the moral decisions as it is the form
that shows developmental regularity and generalizability within and across people
(Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1987).
According to Kohlberg, the structure of an individual’s reasoning represents
her/his “real” thinking. In real-life conflict situations, individuals use the same stages or
forms of reasoning they use in resolving hypothetical dilemmas in the MJI (Hersh,
1979). DeMersseman (as cited in Hersh) found results supporting this assumption.
DeMersseman observed children between 4 and 9 years of age used the same stages of
reasoning in both real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Walker, de Vries, and Trevethan
(1987) asked subjects to respond to the MJI and to remember and discuss a real-life
moral dilemma they experienced. The findings showed consistency in moral stage
between responses to real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. The correlation between the
34
Weighted Average Scores for the two types of dilemmas was highly significant (r =
.83). The results of these studies imply there is a strong consistency in people’s moral
reasoning.
Moral Action
Kohlberg points out individuals’ moral behaviors are affected primarily by
situational factors rather than by the values they adopt. In fact, in general, most
individuals who say cheating is wrong tend to cheat in experimental conditions if they
believe the risk of detection is low. If there is a high risk of detection, however, they are
less likely to cheat. Then, perceived risk rather than espoused values is influential on
individuals’ actions (Hersh, 1979).
Kohlberg believes, however, higher-stage reasoners are less likely to be affected
by situational factors and they tend to act consistently on their values. Krebs (as cited in
Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975) tested this assumption with sixth-graders. He gave 120 junior
high school students from both working and middle-class families several experimental
cheating tests and then interviewed them using the MJI. The results showed 73% of the
preconventional participants cheated on one or more of the tests, 66% of the
conventional participants cheated, whereas only 20% of the postconventional
participants cheated. Malinowski and Smith (as cited in Lapsley, 1996) reported similar
results. Their study showed individuals who reason at the higher stages of moral
judgment were less likely to cheat even if there was a low risk of detection. McNamee
(as cited in Lapsley) observed most participants at Stages 3 and 4 agreed it was proper
to help a victim. However, Stage 4 participants were more likely to actually help the
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victim with respect to Stage 3 participants, and Stage 5 participants were more likely to
actually help the victim with respect to Stage 4 reasoners.
In 1997, Litvack-Miller, McDougal, and Romney examined the structure of
dispositional empathy in middle childhood and its relationship to prosocial behavior. A
total of 478 students from 2nd, 4th, and 6th grades completed an altruism questionnaire, a
social desirability scale, and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Teachers were asked to
rate the participants on such prosocial behaviors as sharing. As an experimental part of
the research, the participants could make monetary donations and do volunteer work to
raise funds. The findings showed only the children advanced in moral reasoning and
empathic and perspective taking skills engaged in prosocial behavior. Carlo, Koller,
and Eisenberg (1998) investigated prosocial moral reasoning in a sample of 116
Brazilian orphaned, institutionalized delinquent, and noninstitutionalized adolescents.
The results showed delinquent adolescents were more likely to prefer lower levels of
prosocial moral reasoning. Nondelinquent adolescents were more advanced in prosocial
moral reasoning. They were more altruistic and honest, and they displayed prosocial
behavior.
These research results support Kohlberg’s (1981) claim that moral reasoning
becomes more closely related to behavior at the higher levels of moral understanding.
As individuals move up the stage hierarchy, they start realizing reasons are motives for
behavior and they show a tendency to perform the action. In other words, at higher
stages individuals become aware moral principles are prescriptive and that
corresponding moral decisions are obligatory. Therefore, higher-stage reasoners are
36
more likely to see the self as responsible for acting upon a judgment. As pointed out by
Lapsley (1996), “Stage 5 subjects should not only agree on the action to be taken (i.e.,
make the autonomous choice), but they should also be expected to follow through with
whatever action this choice obligates them to take” (p. 84).
Characteristics of the Moral Stages
According to Kohlberg, moral stages represent qualitatively distinct ways of
thinking. Individuals in Stage 2 and individuals in Stage 3 may share a similar value,
but their way of thinking about the value is qualitatively different. In other words, even
though the value is similar, the meaning of the value changes in each stage. Therefore,
individuals’ modes of thinking and of solving the same problem are qualitatively
different at different stages (Hersh, 1979).
Each stage forms a structured whole. When an individual enters a new stage,
s/he does not simply modify selective responses. S/he restructures how s/he thinks
about a whole series of moral issues (Hersh, 1979). This suggests an individual’s
thinking reflects the same underlying logical capacity across a range of moral problems.
Based on this assumption of the structure criterion, Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.
(1987) claim “an individual’s thinking will be at a single dominant stage across varying
content, though use of the adjacent stage may also be expected” (p. 77-78). Researchers
found evidence supporting Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.’s assumption that individuals
are either in a stage or in transition between stages. In 1988, Walker (as cited in
Walker, 1996) reviewed the existing literature regarding consistency on the MJI and
concluded 94% of participants’ reasoning was at the two adjacent stages and 66% of
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their reasoning was at a single stage. Kohlberg, in his longitudinal study with Kibbutz
adolescents, observed 83% of participants’ reasoning was at one major stage or at two
adjacent stages (Colby, Kohlberg, Snarey, et al., 1987).
Kohlberg points out stages are hierarchical integrations. Higher stages integrate
the structures found at lower stages (Hersh, 1979). In other words, each higher stage
incorporates the logical features of lower stages and addresses problems unresolved by
lower stages (Kohlberg, 1981). Thus, according to Kohlberg (1994), a later stage’s
mode of judgment is morally more adequate than an earlier stage. For example,
preconventional reasoners look at the facts and perspectives of other people from their
own point of view. Whereas preconventional individuals focus only on the concrete
interests of the people involved in a situation, individuals at the conventional level
focus also on the interests of the group or society and people’s feelings and
expectations involved. Consequently, conventional reasoning can be said to be more
adequate or better than preconventional reasoning as it takes into consideration more
aspects or variables of a moral conflict. In the Heinz dilemma, for instance, while Stage
2 individuals would not even take into account the feelings and expectations of the wife
or the obligation of Heinz as a husband, Stage 3 individuals would take into account
these issues (Hersh).
Postconventional reasoning, on the other hand, is more adequate than
conventional reasoning as it is a guide to action not a rule of action. Therefore, it
provides people greater flexibility. For example, for individuals at the conventional
level, abortion includes one of many moral issues about which an individual should
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turn to her/his system of laws and beliefs in order to decide how to act. If her/his
religious system is against abortion, then s/he may tend to abide by that ruling. If
her/his political system is in favor of abortions, s/he believes they are allowable. But
moral principles do not forbid abortion. Individuals at the postconventional level take
into consideration the interests and rights of both the mother and the fetus and ask
whose right in this situation should take precedence. There is no one correct solution
for this dilemma. In each case individuals involved are supposed to weigh the problem
in relation to their particular situation (Hersh, 1979).
Postconventional reasoning, then, is more advanced than conventional
reasoning as it looks at a moral dilemma from the perspective of any human being, not
from a member of a particular society, culture, or religion. Morally mature individuals
see themselves as responsible for being primarily loyal to protecting individual rights
and secondarily loyal to their own country as long as it supports human rights (Hersh,
1979). Candee (1976) interviewed 372 college students to study the relationship
between the structure of moral judgment and specific moral choice. The results showed
participants at each higher stage of moral structure more often made decisions that were
consistent with human rights and less often made alternative choices that were related
to maintain conventions. The findings of this study support Kohlberg’s claim that at the
postconventional level all people, given the same information, should reach the same
answer.
According to Kohlberg, as it provides more logical, comprehensive, and more
adequate solutions to moral problems, people tend to prefer the highest stage of
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reasoning they can understand (Galbraith & Jones, 1976). In fact, Kohlberg (1981)
observed when Stage 5 reasoners were exposed to Stage 6 arguments, they preferred
Stage 6 arguments over Stage 5 arguments. Researchers found evidence consistent with
Kohlberg’s observation. For example, Turiel (as cited in Hersh, 1979) presented a
sample of 7th grade American children with stage-related advice on how to solve a
moral conflict. One-third of the children was given advice one stage below its present
stage, a second third was given advice one stage above its present stage, and the last
group was given advice two stages above its own stage of reasoning. Posttest results
showed the group receiving advice one stage above its own stage was more changed by
the advice with respect to the groups receiving the other kinds of advice.
Rest (as cited in Hersh, 1979) provided a list of responses to the Heinz dilemma
to a sample of American adolescents. The list consisted of one answer at each of the 6
moral stages for why Heinz should or should not steal the drug to save his wife’s life.
The participants were expected to restate each answer by using their own words and
rank the statements according to how good they were. As a result of his research, Rest
observed the participants had a tendency to rank low all responses at stages lower than
their own. They tended to restate responses at stages higher than their own in terms of
their own stage and to prefer the response at one stage above their own to the response
at their present stage.
Walker (as cited in Lapsley, 1996) measured children’s moral reasoning, then,
he exposed the children to moral reasoning either one (+1) or two stages (+2) above
their own stage. Posttest results showed both +1 and +2 stage reasoning caused
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movement toward the next stage. Even though +2 reasoning induced stage movement,




Turiel (as cited in Rest, 1997) does not agree with Kohlberg’s claim that
conventional morality precedes postconventional morality. Turiel asserts morality and
social conventions are separate, different, and parallel domains of cognitive
development, rather than a single system as assumed by Kohlberg. According to Turiel,
children very early in life comprehend hitting a playmate (moral domain) is in a distinct
domain from a boy wearing a skirt (social convention). The moral domain includes
those behaviors that directly hurt or help other people, or treat others unequally.
“Children observe the direct effects of their acts on others and formulate moral thinking
accordingly. On the other hand, children come to realize that there are social rules that
help to organize a society (forms of address, eating etiquette, sex-stereotyped
behavior)” (Rest, 1997, p. 424). Then, according to Turiel (as cited in Shweder,
Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990), morality represents objective obligations concerning harm,
justice, and the well-being and rights of others. In other words, actions or events carry
that moral quality if they “involve physical or psychological harm, personal or private
property, promises or commitments, or the allocation of scarce resources” (Shweder et
al., 1990, p. 153). Conventional actions, on the other hand, do not carry a moral quality
as their rightness or wrongness is obtained solely by virtue of social consensus.
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According to Turiel (as cited in Shweder et al., 1990), children develop the idea
of a moral action and the idea of a conventional action and differentiate these two kinds
of events from each other as they have had direct experience with both types of actions
and have learned these are not the same. In fact, Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana (as cited in
Shweder et al.) observed that 3- to 5-year-old children can discriminate moral rules
from conventional rules and recognize moral obligations cannot be changed by group
consensus, whereas conventional obligations are arbitrary, can be altered if the majority
wants to alter them, and can vary from society to society. According to Turiel, these
findings suggest children view moral transgressions as more generalizably wrong,
independent of rules, and less permissible in comparison with conventional
transgressions.
According to Rest (1997), Turiel’s focus is on content, not on structure. He
misconstrues what is meant by “conventional morality.” Rest points out Kohlberg’s
stages are not characterized by lists of specific acts (e.g., hitting a playmate is wrong).
Those are content issues each culture identifies in terms of concrete rules. Kohlberg
does not define the moral stages in terms of specific prohibitions or prescriptions.
Rather, he defines the stages “in terms of the fundamental rationale for what makes an
act moral or immoral” (Rest, 1997, p. 425). In other words, in Kohlberg’s theory
specific rules (content) are distinguished from the underlying rationale for having rules
(structure). Therefore, according to Rest, Kohlberg’s moral stages concentrate on a
completely different level of mental operations than does Turiel.
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For this reason, Rest (1997) does not agree with Turiel’s claim that morality and
social conventions are separate domains. Instead, like Kohlberg, he believes principled
morality succeeds conventional morality. According to Rest, the main evidence
showing conventional reasoning develops before postconventional reasoning comes
from the DIT which is a recognition test. Rest states “instead of having Kohlberg’s
problem with the rarity of principled thinking, the main index of the DIT is the “P”
score—preference for Stages 5 and 6” (Rest, 1997, p. 427). Thus, the DIT provides the
researcher enough opportunity to test whether postconventional morality
developmentally follows conventional morality. Rest emphasizes the DIT has been
used in over 1000 studies and data have been collected from over 100.000 participants,
and many longitudinal, cross-sectional, intervention, and correlational studies with
other developmental measures show conventional reasoning precedes postconventional
thinking.
Based on their study, Shweder et al. (1990) also question Turiel’s claim.
Shweder et al., in their cross-cultural research of Indian (180 children and 60 adults)
and American (180 children and 60 adults) populations, asked participants from both
countries to judge how wrong each of 39 acts would be (e.g., whether it is wrong for a
widow to wear jewelry and bright-colored clothes 6 months after the death of her
husband or wrong to beat a disobedient wife). The researchers observed striking
differences between the two samples in what they considered wrong. Shweder et al.’s
research findings can be summarized as follows:
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     (a) in India, many of the social convention transgressions were
     considered more serious than the moral transgressions, (b) in India,
     the social conventions were not considered alterable or contingent,
     (c) the Indians did not make the distinction between the moral and
     the social conventional domains that Turiel said is universal—
         instead, the Indians said their social conventions should be obeyed
         universally, (d) young Indians were like older Indians, young
         Americans were like older Americans. (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, &
         Thoma, 1999, p. 167-168)
Shweder et al.’s (1990) research showed the idea of convention (e.g.,
conventional obligations are consensus-based, relative to one’s culture, and alterable)
occurred almost exclusively in the reasoning of American adults and older American
children (it did not exist among American children under age 10). American children
and adults reflected the democratic belief that “any collection of like-minded
individuals is free to construct for themselves their own design for living, as long as
other differently minded individuals are free to exit and form their own society”
(Shweder et al., 1990, p. 160). However, as mentioned above, Hindu participants did
not reflect the idea of convention. They saw their practices as direct expressions of
natural law. Whereas Americans reflected the idea of convention and became more
relativistic in their judgments as they aged, Indians showed a greater tendency to regard
their practices as universally moral, binding, nonrelative, and unalterable (Shweder et
al.).
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Based on the results of their research, Shweder et al. (1990) claimed morality
and social conventions were not different domains universally. The researchers
observed the idea of convention had relatively less importance in everyday
understandings of obligations. The idea of universal moral obligations appeared to be
more widely distributed across ages and cultures in comparison with the idea of
conventional obligations. These findings led the researchers to conclude the emergence
of reasoning based on conventional obligations was a culture-specific development.
Alternative Forms of Postconventional Moral Reasoning
After Kohlberg’s cross-cultural finding that relatively few people around the
world display genuine postconventional reasoning, moral development theorists started
questioning the underlying interpretive logic of his theory (Shweder et al., 1990).
From Shweder’s point of view, Kohlberg’s notion of only one universal
developmental pathway for morality is ethnocentric and uninformed
about cultural differences. Shweder argued that fundamental differences
in human intentions and actions can be accounted for in terms of
cultural differences, which vary greatly over the world. People in
different cultures build different conceptions of the world, including
different moral realities. (Rest et al., 1999, p. 168)
According to Shweder et al. (1990), American people reflect “rights-based
morality,” whereas Indian people reflect “duty-based morality.” In America, the
postconventional thinking is based on the natural “right” to free contract, personal
choice, and individual liberty. The postconventional thinking in India, on the other
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hand, is based on the natural “duty” to respect the truths of Hindu dharma—“one must
do one’s duty to fulfill one’s role, because sin is always punished in this life or the next;
the natural and supernatural world guarantees that everyone gets what they deserve”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 171-172). Then, in a duty-based culture, “the social order dictates
specified duties based on roles and status within the social structure” (Turiel, 1998, p.
892). The individual and her/his interior states, preferences, and intentions are not given
much importance. Moreover, s/he is not allowed to deviate from rules. “There is no
conception of a natural right, such as free speech, that might lead to advocating
deviation from the socially defined right” (Turiel, 1998, p. 892).
Miller (1994), based on her studies of American and Hindu Indian populations,
supports the claim that an individually oriented interpersonal moral understanding
develops among Americans, whereas a duty-based interpersonal moral understanding
develops among Hindu Indians. Miller summarizes her research results as follows: in
America the highest priority is accorded to individual rights. Therefore, individuals
have a minimalist view of interpersonal moral obligations. The individual is expected to
detach herself/himself from others and be independent of the social order. For this
reason, individuals “are oriented to self-sufficiency, self-reliance, independence, and
resistance to social pressure for conformity or obedience to authority” (Turiel, 1998, p.
892). The focus is on the individual’s right to self-determination and to self-
actualization. Individuals are expected to orient toward meeting their own needs and
pursuing their own satisfaction, success, and happiness. Even though American people
view “it as legitimate to have socially enforceable moral rules around issues that
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directly further the rights and interests of the individual, such as matters of justice, they
are reticent to subject to social regulation matters that do not directly promote
individual rights and interests, such as interpersonal responsibilities” (Miller, 1994, p.
18). Thus, it can be said that American moral perspective focuses on a contractual
conception of interpersonal commitments. American people regard relationships as
voluntary associations intended to serve reciprocal need fulfillment. Bound by choice
and not by duty, individuals are viewed as having considerable discretion about
whether or not to respond to others’ needs (Miller).
In contrast, Hindu Indians regard interpersonal responsibilities as obligatory
rather than as voluntary. In an individually oriented framework, the contract is seen as
the prototypical form of social relationship. However, in a duty-based framework,
familial relationships are treated as prototypical (Miller, 1994). Therefore, the group as
an interconnected network of relationships is central and shared goals are primary.
People “are oriented to tradition, duty, obedience to authority, interdependence, and
social harmony. Hierarchy, status, and role distinctions predominate” (Turiel, 1998, p.
892). Even though in a duty-based interpersonal moral understanding personal
happiness and satisfaction are not goals, the system is not seen as oppressing the
individual or as requiring that personal desires be subordinated to the requirements of
the social order. Instead, people see themselves as realizing their own essential natures
and as obtaining spiritual merit by meeting social role expectations. The duty-based
interpersonal morality reflects a contextualized style of moral reasoning. Therefore, in a
duty-based framework “there is a tendency to locate moral responsibility for behavior
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relationally by reference to processes occurring between persons and the surround,
rather than to focus on the autonomous individual as the locus of responsibility”
(Miller, 1994, p. 20-21).
In sum, Miller’s (1994) research results show Indians assume a general
obligation to respond to the needs of others, while American people see this obligation
as dependent on the nature of the relationship and degree of the need. Indians regard
interpersonal responsibilities as subject to social enforcement. Americans, on the other
hand, see interpersonal responsibilities as matters for personal decision-making. Indians
give greater priority to interpersonal responsibilities relative to justice obligations in
comparison with Americans. In contrast, Americans give precedence to the justice
obligations and portray this choice in moral terms. In general, Indians are more prone to
support the interpersonal over the justice alternatives and to categorize this endorsed
alternative as a socially enforceable moral duty.
According to Shweder et al. (1990) and Miller (1994), it is likely that
collectivistic (or non-Western) cultures other than India also reflect duty-based views of
interpersonal responsibilities, while individualistic (or Western) societies other than
America reflect individually oriented views. In fact, research shows the duty-based
moral understanding found among Hindu Indians may also be present in other
collectivistic cultures. For instance, Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese, Tibetan
Buddhist monks, Nigerian and Pakistani Muslims, and rural populations in British
Honduras, Kenya, and Papua New Guinea have been observed to place greater
emphasis on helpfulness and on obligations to relatives. Therefore, contrary to
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Kohlberg’s ideas, an individually oriented interpersonal moral code may exist in
relatively few societies outside of North America and parts of Western Europe, and
“dharma” may be an alternative form of postconventional reasoning (Rest et al., 1999).
Gilligan’s Theory Of Feminine Morality
Gilligan, who became popular with the feminist revolution during 1970s,
affected the discussions in moral theory, psychology, feminism, and other related fields
with her ideas (Shweder & Haidt, 1994). Her objective was to give information about
women’s development which she felt was omitted by traditional developmental theories
and, thus, expand the point of view of developmental psychology about human
development (Hekman, 1995). For this reason, she sees her work mainly as a
contribution to psychology, not to moral philosophy (Siegel, 1986). On the one hand,
her ideas and her studies were seen as a messenger of a new moral theory and as a
voice against the masculine tradition. On the other hand, however, her methods were
criticized, and she was found to be theoretically confused and even anti-feminist
(Hekman).
Gilligan’s Research Technique
 As mentioned before, Kohlberg’s studies showed men were more morally
advanced with respect to women (Gilligan, 1995). After Kohlberg’s observation of
women being morally less advanced compared to men, Gilligan (1982) focused her
studies on women’s development in order to be able to find the reason for difference
between men’s and women’s moral reasoning. By doing interviews with women, she
tried to find what created moral conflict for them in their lives and what types of
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decision-making strategies they used in resolving these conflicts. According to
Gilligan, women’s daily lives are built on close interactions with people and, thus, they
are interested in resolving moral conflicts experienced in actual contexts. For this
reason, she focused her interviews on real-life dilemmas that include real experiences,
not on hypothetical dilemmas that deal with the problems in imaginary relations and
situations.
Gilligan, as a result of her interviews saw that women, “when describing their
own experiences of moral conflict and choice, defined and resolved moral problems in
ways that differed from those described in the existing theories of moral development,
and in the measures traditionally used for its assessment” (Brown, Tappan, & Gilligan,
1995, p. 312).
Gilligan’s Three Levels of Moral Reasoning
In order to study the development of women’s moral reasoning, Gilligan (1982)
interviewed a group of 29 female subjects, aged 15 and 33 years, facing a substantial
real-life moral dilemma: whether or not to have an abortion. She stated this issue posed
a central conflict for women and this conflict springs from the tension between the
maintenance of self and the maintenance of relationships (Tronto, 1995). In fact, the
women participating in this research could not decide whose decisions and choices
should be taken into consideration about continuing the pregnancy: theirs or those of
the others close to them. Therefore, according to Gilligan, this study showed women
experienced the conflict of whether they were supposed to be responsive primarily to
their own needs or to the needs of others in their moral decisions.
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Gilligan observed women solved this conflict by correctly balancing concerns
for the self with concerns for others (Tronto, 1995). However, the success of this
depended on the woman’s ability to demonstrate mature reasoning (Gilligan, 1982). On
the basis of subjects’ responses, Gilligan found the way to mature reasoning was
through a three-level progression. In other words, she identified three levels of
reasoning: from an egocentric through a societal to a universal perspective.
In the first level, the woman’s responsibility focuses on the self and self-serving
relationships in order to ensure individual survival. The self’s needs, not the other’s, are
given priority in decisions. Therefore, there is inequality between self and other in this
level. When the satisfaction of one’s own needs is seen to be selfish and the
responsibility is oriented to the needs of others, the individual leaves the first level and
enters the following transitional phase that provides the path to the second level
(Winkler, 1994).
In the second level, it is important for women to conform to society’s image of
“good woman.” “Goodness is seen as self-sacrificial caring for others in order to gain
their acceptance” (Walker, 1994, p. 329). For this reason, there is also inequality
between self and other in this level. But this time the individual is responsive to others’
needs instead of the self’s. When the individual realizes she is responsible to herself as
much as to others, she leaves the second level and enters the following transitional
phase providing the path to the third level (Walker).
In the third level, she is free from conventional constraints. She realizes caring
for others is not possible without caring for self. Therefore, in this level, she “strives to
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encompass the needs of both self and others, to be responsible to others and thus to be
good but also to be responsible to herself and thus to be honest and real” (Gilligan,
1982, p. 85). In other words, she tries not only to consider the needs of others, but also
to do the best and the right for herself. Thus, she is also more honest and realistic to her
own self. Consequently, she can have open, and honest relationships with others that
depend on real feelings and thoughts. She is aware of her own self-worth. And as she
acknowledges her own self, she starts making her own choices and being responsible
for them. It can be said that while “goodness” is important for women in the second
level, the “truth” is important in the third level. In this level, care is seen as a self-
chosen, universal obligation that condemns exploitation and violence, and requires one
to respond (Lapsley, 1996).
As can be understood from the information above, in each level, women
interviewed conceptualized responsibility in different ways (Winkler, 1994). There is
increasing differentiation between self and other as the higher levels are reached
(Gilligan, 1982). Progress in these stages “is motivated, in part, by the individual’s
increasing understanding of human relationships and, in part, by the attempt to maintain
one’s own integrity and care for one’s self without neglecting others” (Meyers &
Kittay, 1987, p. 8).
Gilligan’s Summary of Her Research Results
Gilligan summarizes her research findings as follows: women’s sense of self is
built on interdependence. They see their selves as relational. The relational self is
defined “as having both a need for recognition and a need to understand the other”
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(Held, 1993, p. 60) and these needs are viewed as compatible. They are created during
the mother-child interaction and are satisfied in a mutually empathetic relationship.
This kind of relationship does not cause a loss of self. Rather, in this relationship, self
and other both respect each other’s subjectivity. In other words, “both give and take in a
way that not only contributes to the satisfaction of their needs as individuals but also
affirms the larger relational unit they compose. Maintaining this larger relational unit
then becomes a goal” (Held, 1993, p. 60). Consequently, maturity is defined not as
individual autonomy but as competence in creating and maintaining relations of
empathy and mutual intersubjectivity (Held). Therefore, for women, the priority is to be
in connection with others instead of developing independence. Their reasoning is
contextual and embedded in relations with others. They do not isolate themselves from
others while they approach situations, instead, they look at situations from this
interdependent or relational perspective. Thus, in their thought process, subjectivity
instead of objectivity is dominant (Gilligan, 1982).
For women, the loss of relationship means the loss of self. For this reason, they
give great importance to not causing conflicts with others, and if there is a conflict, they
give great importance to repair the relations. When there is a problem, they listen to
each other and try to understand each other’s feelings, thoughts, and particular situation
(Gilligan, 1988). This is important for finding a specific solution to a specific problem
(Gilligan, 1982).
Women’s moral concerns focus on care, response to others’ needs, and enhance
another’s well-being, instead of protecting individual rights and evoking strict equality.
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They try to solve problems without hurting or leaving anyone alone, considering
everyone’s happiness and needs. Consequently, as a guide, they use care reasoning that
includes emotions such as empathy, sympathy, love, and compassion, instead of justice
reasoning that involves logic in the solutions of moral problems (Gilligan, 1982).
Gilligan’s Claim of Two Different Moral Domains
“The interpretation of observed differences in moral reasoning-particularly
gender differences-has historically been constrained by the assumption that there is a
single moral perspective; i.e., male-defined justice perspective” (Brown et al., 1995, p.
313). However, Gilligan (1982), during her research on abortion-decision, observed
that rather than seeking solutions to moral conflicts by applying abstract rules of justice
to particular situations, most women interviewed were worried about preserving actual
human relationships and caring for those for whom they felt responsible. In other
words, she observed women give importance to different things in relationships and
focus on different issues during moral conflicts than do men. These observations led
Gilligan to conclude women’s moral thinking emerges not as deficient but as a different
voice.
According to Gilligan (1982), women’s moral concerns are different from
men’s, and they approach moral problems from a different perspective as compared to
men. Therefore, Gilligan claims there are two different moral domains: the domain of
care and responsibility and the domain of justice and rights. Women develop the ethic
of care, and they look at moral issues from this perspective, while men develop the
ethic of justice.
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However, many researchers criticized Gilligan’s methodology and considered
her evidence as faulty. Walker (1994) stated Gilligan’s data were derived from females
only, and found, as a result of his research, that gender differences in moral
development were not statistically significant. “These criticisms, as well as Gilligan’s
own research led her to reformulate her position in terms of the focus phenomenon”
(Hekman, 1995, p. 18).
Focus Phenomenon
Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) did a study on individual’s personal experience of
moral conflict and choice and included not only female subjects but also male. During
their research, they asked participants to think about real-life moral dilemmas they had
experienced and then to rate the extent to which they concentrated on justice or care
concerns. As a result of their study, they observed 65% of the participating males
revealed a justice focus, 32% showed a mixture of care and justice, and only one
showed a care focus. In contrast, 35% of the participating females showed a care focus,
35% showed a mixture of care and justice, and 29% showed a justice focus. These
findings led the researchers to conclude that “men and women appeal to both care and
justice in their moral deliberations but that men gravitate toward the justice orientation
and women gravitate toward the care orientation” (Lapsley, 1996, p. 141). In other
words, even though individuals are capable of using both perspectives, women use care
reasoning more than men over time, whereas men use justice reasoning more than
women (Lapsley). Gilligan and Attanucci have called this finding the “focus
phenomenon.”
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According to Brown et al. (1995), these two perspectives can be seen as the
relational voices or moral orientations of justice and care. Gilligan (1995) suggests
these two perspectives do not negate one another, but represent two distinct ways of
perceiving and responding to problems, conflicts, and dilemmas in relationships.
Johnston (1988) found results supporting Gilligan’s ideas. She provided fables
including moral conflicts to 60 boys and girls between the age of 11 and 15 years. She
asked the participants to state and resolve the conflict posed by the stories, and then she
asked if there was another way to resolve this conflict. As a result of her research, she
saw girls more often spontaneously used and preferred care solutions, while boys more
often spontaneously used and preferred justice solutions to the stories she posed.
However, she also observed boys and girls could shift their perspectives and look at the
situations from the viewpoint of both perspectives when invited to do so. According to
Brown et al. (1995), these findings show human beings not only have multiple voices,
“but they can and frequently do oscillate from one voice to another in their moral
discourse” (Brown et al., 1995, p. 324).
The Link Between Selfhood and Morality
Gilligan (1988) claimed which perspective individuals mainly use in their lives
changed according to what type of self they developed. According to Gilligan, man
attains his self by detaching himself from others (separate self), and this forms a basis
for the justice perspective. On the other hand, woman attains her self by staying
attached to others (relational self), and this forms a basis for the care perspective. In
fact, Lyons’s (1988) research showed separate individuals tend to use a morality of
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justice, while relational individuals tend to use a morality of care. For this reason,
Gilligan believes morality and selfhood are intimately linked. In other words, modes of
self-definition affect modes of moral judgment. According to Hekman (1995), this
viewpoint is one of Gilligan’s greatest contributions in the field of moral theory.
The Origins of the Orientations of Justice and Care
Brown et al. (1995) locate the development of the two selves (separate
self/relational self), and, thus, the justice and care orientations, in two dimensions of
early childhood relationships. One dimension is that of equality/inequality, and the
other dimension is that of attachment/detachment.
Young children who see their relationships with others from an
equality/inequality perspective feel smaller, less capable, and less powerful than older
children and adults. But with development, they progress to equality and independence
and, thus, overcome these unequal relationships (Walker, 1995). According to Brown et
al. (1995), this dimension of relationship has been stressed by both cognitive and
psychoanalytic theorists who studied moral development. Focusing on the constraint of
the young child’s situation, these theorists defined morality as justice and saw
development as the child’s progression toward equality and independence (Gilligan &
Attanucci, 1988).
However, according to Gilligan (1988), children also experience attachment,
and these attachment relationships create a different awareness of self with respect to
the awareness of self created by experiences of inequality. Through attachment
relationships, children “discover the patterns of human interaction and observe the
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ways in which people care for and hurt one another. The experience of attachment
profoundly affects children’s understanding of human feelings and how people should
act toward one another” (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988, p. 114-115). Therefore, children
who see their relationships with others from an attachment/detachment perspective are
sensitive to considering others’ well-being and the need to maintain connections with
others (Gilligan).
The Development of Different Moral Orientations of Two Genders
According to Gilligan (1988), both equality/inequality and
attachment/detachment relationships are experienced by boys and girls. Consequently,
these experiences sensitize children to two different moral standards: the standard of
justice (do not treat others unfairly) and the standard of care (help others). As both
women and men have these two moral standards in their backgrounds, these two moral
perspectives interact in many cases in men’s and women’s lives, and they cause
confusion, tension, and ambiguity in resolving real-life dilemmas. As a result, women
and men experience the conflict of which perspective they should use to solve moral
problems, when the demands of justice and the demands of care clash (Lapsley, 1996).
However, even though individuals are capable of looking at things in two
different ways, and even though they feel conflict in which perspective they should use,
they believe there is one “better or right way” of seeing, and this “right way” makes the
other way disappear. According to Brown et al. (1995), different upbringings engender
different moral orientations. Gender-role socialization emphasizes the experience of
attachment/detachment and, thus, relational self development for girls, whereas it
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emphasizes the experience of equality/inequality and, thus, separate self development
for boys. This situation makes a different orientation “right or better” for two different
sexes (Lapsley, 1996).
Following birth, both boys and girls interact primarily with their mothers in the
first years as their fathers are normally at work. However, early mother-daughter
relationships contrast with early mother-son relationships (Chodorow, 1978). Mothers
“experience their daughters as more like, and continuous with, themselves” (Gilligan,
1982, p. 7) because they are from the same sex and push their daughters toward
connection and dependency (Attanucci, 1988). As girls are not encouraged to be
separate from their mothers, they become attached to their mothers and identify with
them (Hekman, 1995). Consequently, in girls, the experience of inequality becomes less
salient, whereas the experience of attachment, of connecting with others, is more
central to their self-definition. Therefore, they give importance to the nature or the
strength of connection more than the consequences of unequal relationships (Gilligan &
Wiggins, 1988). In terms of self-esteem, it is seen as being more crucial to make and
maintain relationships with others. Consequently, care becomes more salient with
respect to justice in their moral experiences (Gilligan).
In contrast, mothers experience their sons as a male opposite (Gilligan, 1982)
and push them toward independence (Attanucci, 1988). For this reason, boys separate
themselves from their mothers and tend towards identifying with their fathers. Because
boys identify with their fathers, the physical power and the authority of their fathers
become their focus. Therefore, for boys, the experience of inequality is more salient,
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and the desire to overcome this unequal relationship becomes more important in self-
concept organization. For this reason, boys can be insensitive to problems springing
from detachment, and independence becomes more crucial for self-esteem.
Consequently, justice becomes more salient in their moral experiences with respect to
care (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988).
The Signs of Justice and Care Perspectives in
Boys and Girls During Middle Childhood
Lever (as cited in Gilligan, 1982) examined if there are gender differences in the
games children play. Her study included 181 fifth-grade, white, 10 and 11-year-old
children from middle-class families. Similar to early childhood, she observed boys are
sensitive to the concepts of equality, separation, and justice, whereas girls are sensitive
to connection, relations, and compassion in middle-childhood. Her research results can
be summarized as follows: boys play more competitive games and continuously quarrel
during the play. However, they pay attention to rights, rules, and legal debates in the
game and, thus, they can effectively resolve disputes. Girls, on the other hand, prefer
play in which competition is indirect and, therefore, they fall into less disputes which
require adjudication in their play. They are more tolerant to rules and more willing to
make exceptions. When there is a quarrel, they tend to end the play instead of resolving
the disputes in order not to break the relationships.
As pointed out by Gilligan (1982), Lever’s study shows boys are more
concerned with rules during play. Within the limits of the rules, boys learn
independence, competing with friends, playing with the enemy, and “the organizational
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skills necessary for coordinating the activities of large and diverse groups of people”
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 10). Therefore, in boys, play fosters the development of taking the
role of the generalized other and learning the abstraction of human relationships. Girls,
on the other hand, are more concerned with relationships during play. They learn to be
cooperative, as opposed to being competitive, in play. For this reason, in girls, play
fosters “the development of the empathy and sensitivity necessary for taking the role of
the particular other and points more toward knowing the other as different from the
self” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 10).
These observations indicate boys and girls reach puberty with different
interpersonal orientations and social experiences. Boys grow up giving priority to
separation and individuation, whereas girls grow up giving priority to connection and
relationships. However, according to Gilligan (1982), separation, not connection, is
seen as being crucial in the development of identity in adolescence; therefore, adult
development of boys is viewed as more healthy in that they separate, whereas adult
developmental progression of girls, as they cannot successfully separate, is seen as less
healthy.
The Psychological Development of Girls and
the Emergence of the Care Perspective
Brown and Gilligan (1992) believe the adolescent period is a crisis for girls.
However, according to these researchers, the reason for this crisis is not because girls
fail to separate. Brown and Gilligan did research on the psychological development of
preadolescent and adolescent girls and concluded the following.
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Contemporary moral development theories (including Kohlberg’s) view
development as a progression from dependence to independence, from reliance on
relationships to autonomous selfhood (Hekman, 1995). However, adolescent girls
perceive dependence to be positive rather than negative, and they resist detaching from
their relationships and prefer to stay attached. It is a mistake to see girls as a failure in
adult development just because they resist detachment. Girls do not develop the
autonomous self, not because they cannot succeed in being independent, but because
they do not prefer to do so. Psychological health for girls can be defined as staying in
relationships as opposed to disengaging from them. Real psychological crises in
women’s lives spring from disconnection (Brown & Gilligan, 1992).
Girls, in preadolescence, seem to be outspoken and self-confident, and they
want honest dialogues. Preadolescent girls believe honest dialogues can be full of
genuine disagreements, but they know these disagreements will not jeopardize
relationships. They are not afraid of engaging in conflicts with others, and they are able
to make their own decisions. Adolescent girls, on the other hand, seem to be affected by
social norms, values, and roles. In other words, priority for adolescent girls is
conformity to society’s expectations and engaging in conventional female behavior.
Conventional female behavior necessitates not hurting others, not engaging in open
conflicts and disagreements in relationships, and, thus, withholding real feelings and
thoughts. Consequently, adolescent girls give priority to meeting others’ needs in
making their decisions. Otherwise, they can be perceived as rude, mean, and selfish.
For this reason, they abandon real relationships in which genuine feelings and thoughts
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are shared and get involved in idealized relationships. However, in contrast with how
this is generally perceived, this situation actually constitutes disconnection instead of
connection (Brown & Gilligan, 1992).
To summarize, for preadolescent girls, it is more important to have authentic
and honest relationships than to maintain any relationship, whereas for adolescent girls,
it is more important to maintain relationships and prevent isolation and violation than it
is to have open and mutual relationships. Prior to adolescence, there is no great
differentiation between the justice and care perspectives as preadolescent girls are also
concerned with obeying the rules and, therefore, they also exhibit the justice
perspective. Then, for girls, the care perspective gains importance especially in
adolescence (Brown et al., 1995).
Society considers moral problems not from a viewpoint of the concerns and
values expressed by the adolescent girls, but from a viewpoint of abstract and universal
principles. Therefore, according to Gilligan (1988), as thinking takes a conventional
form during adolescence, girls are affected by the dominant moral voice of the
society—justice. For this reason, in this period, justice reasoning, which is explicit in
traditional moral development theories, takes importance in girls’ moral judgments. In
other words, adolescent girls base their moral decisions on justice instead of care, even
though their moral voices are rooted in emotion, particularity, and connectedness.
Johnston (1988) found results supporting Gilligan’s ideas. She observed 15-year-old
girls look at moral problems primarily from the justice perspective.
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Brown and Gilligan’s (1992) study demonstrates preadolescent girls can
maintain their selves in their relationships. However, when they move into adolescence,
they leave this “self” and turn inward in order to display the image of “good woman.”
In other words, they are pushed by society to become selfless and move toward self-
sacrifice. Also, their care voice is suppressed by the justice voice, which is dominant in
society. Therefore, according to Brown and Gilligan, for girls, adolescence constitutes a
crisis or regression, not progression.
Differences During Adulthood
During early childhood, middle childhood and adolescence, girls mature with
values different from boys. This difference in values continues during adulthood and
shapes the priorities of the individual. In fact, Horner (as cited in Gilligan, 1982) found
women avoid competitive achievement and success because they think these can cause
social rejection, isolation, and loss of femininity. Men, on the other hand, avoid
intimacy and close personal affiliations because they think these can violate their rights
and limit personal success.
Gilligan’s Thoughts on the Coexistence of Justice and Care
According to Gilligan (1995), the justice and care perspectives are independent
from but complement each other. They constitute a harmonious whole together
(Hekman, 1995). What is important is not to see which perspective is superior or better
(Brown et al., 1995). “Rather, the issue concerns how the two moral perspectives
interact in situations of moral choice and the gender-typed pattern of preference
exhibited by men and women” (Lapsley, 1996, p. 140).
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Gilligan points out that mature reasoning about care should incorporate
considerations of justice and rights (Koehn, 1998). However, she believes an impartial
concern for others’ rights is not sufficient to provide for care (Lyons, 1988) and trying
to ensure equality among people or protect individual rights is not sufficient for
respecting people’s rights. According to Gilligan (1995), the care perspective “draws
attention to the fact that one’s own terms may differ from those of others. Justice in this
context becomes understood as respect for people in their own terms” (p. 36-37).
Therefore, according to Gilligan, the best way to respect people’s rights is to consider
their particular thoughts and feelings in solving moral conflicts.
Gilligan (1988) states participants who spontaneously use the justice reasoning
often agree the solution suggested by exponents of the care reasoning is a better
solution. In fact, she observed a group of boys using justice strategies would actually
prefer using care solutions if they did not find care as being “naive” and “unworkable.”
According to Gilligan, as long as morality is equated with justice and care is equated
with self-sacrifice, women are likely to appear problematic within moral theory and
individuals will tend to be distant from the care perspective. Gilligan (1995) argues care
includes a mutual relationship, not self-sacrifice. In other words, care is both self-
serving and other-serving. Care relationships are expected to grow with respect to
reciprocity. Therefore, ethical caring should not be confused with unconditional love.
In ethical caring, “the self is sufficiently distinct from the relation as to be entitled to
specify some conditions which her voluntary relations should meet. In the event these
conditions are not met, she is entitled to break off these relations” (Koehn, 1998, p. 46).
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According to Gilligan (1982), there are sex differences in morality, and this fact
cannot be denied. Moral developmental theories should include the experiences of
women as well as the experiences of men and, thus, include the moral voices of both
sexes. Many feminist writers agree with Gilligan’s ideas. According to Baier (1995),
“the best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and men, has to
harmonize justice and care. The morality it theorizes about is after all for all persons,
for men and for women, and will need their combined insights” (p. 57).
Research Findings on Gilligan’s Fundamental Theses
Differences in Moral Orientation
As mentioned before, Gilligan (1982) claims two different moral domains: the
domain of care and responsibility and the domain of justice and rights. Most people
focus on one orientation and minimally represent the other. Individuals are consistent in
the use of a single orientation. Men predominantly use the justice perspective, while
women predominantly use the care perspective (Brown et al., 1995).
Research Findings in the U.S.
Research shows care reasoning can be identified in people’s responses to both
real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. The majority of people, regardless of their gender,
use both the justice and care orientations. Therefore, both males and females have been
found to be sensitive to the potential pain others might suffer and they have been found
to consider human relationships important moral considerations. However, the studies
examining the hypothesis that moral orientation is gender-related result in inconsistent
findings. While some studies indicate women show a preference for the care orientation
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and men for justice in self-identified moral dilemmas, some studies do not show a
significant difference between men’s and women’s moral orientations (Bebeau &
Brabeck, 1994).
In 1986 Ford and Lowery did research with a sample of 202 college students
(101 male and 101 female undergraduates) between 18 and 29 years of age. The
participants completed a self-report questionnaire on moral dilemmas they had
experienced. Then, they rated their use of both justice and care perspectives in solving
those dilemmas. The results showed sex differences in moral orientation were very
small and statistically nonsignificant. Both sexes have been observed to consider issues
of relationship, care, and responsibility, as well as issues of fairness, justice, and rights.
However, female participants were more consistent in their use of care reasoning,
whereas male participants were more consistent in their use of justice reasoning.
Jadack, Hyde, Moore, and Keller (1995) provided hypothetical dilemmas to college
freshmen and seniors and asked them to explain why they believed the characters
should or should not engage in risky behaviors. There were no gender differences in
moral orientation.
Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, and Gibbs (1996) conducted a study on 543
participants, aged 9 to 81 years, including delinquents. The researchers observed care
reasoning was prevalent in females’ moral judgment. In 1996, Lollis, Ross, and Leroux
observed 40 families with two children, aged 2 and 4 years. They investigated gender
differences in the parents’ moral orientation, and gender differences in the socialization
of moral orientation of the children. The researchers observed gender-related
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orientations in parents. Regardless of the gender of the children, fathers used slightly
more justice than care orientation, while mothers used significantly more care than
justice. However, children were not being socialized differently according to their sex.
In 1997 Cassidy, Chu, and Dahlsgaard investigated the moral reasoning preschoolers
use in solving moral problems. They provided moral dilemmas to 31 preschool children
and asked them to state and resolve the problem posed by the dilemmas. Results
showed justice and care solutions were equally frequent in children’s answers. There
were no gender differences in moral orientation.
As pointed out by Colby and Damon (1994), studies on moral orientation yield
little support for the view that there is a generalized distinction between men and
women in their orientations. Most researchers believe the choice of moral orientation is
linked to the type of dilemma discussed, not to gender. In fact, Walker et al. (1987) in
their research on 80 Canadian family triads (e.g., mother, father, and child) found that
not the dilemma format (hypothetical or real-life) but the content of the dilemma was
an important influence on orientation use. Personal/relational dilemmas tended to be
discussed in terms of care and response, whereas impersonal/nonrelational dilemmas
tended to be reasoned in terms of justice and rights (regardless of the participant’s sex).
Research Findings in Other Cultures
Other cultures also tested Gilligan’s claim of separate moral domains. As
mentioned above, Walker et al. (1987) interviewed 80 Canadian families. Female
participants reported more personal-relationship conflicts, whereas male participants
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reported more impersonal-relationship conflicts. Therefore, gender differences were
evident in dilemma content. However, when dilemma content was controlled, sex
differences disappeared in orientations.
Stander and Jensen (1993) administered the World View Questionnaire to 60
Chinese and 61 American university students. As a result of their research they
observed a significantly higher total number of caring adjectives chosen by female
participants than by male participants. Therefore, females were found to be more
oriented towards using care reasoning. However, contrary to expectations, the Chinese
chose much fewer caring adjectives with respect to Americans.
In 1996 Lyons interviewed 27 (14 female, 13 male) undergraduate students
attending the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. Turkish male students
showed a tendency to be more oriented towards separation and objectiveness. And the
majority of male students used justice reasoning in resolving moral dilemmas. In
contrast, Turkish female students showed a tendency to be more oriented towards being
connected and contextual, and most of the female students used care reasoning in
resolving moral dilemmas. However, there were no significant gender differences…
     in the topic of moral conflict chosen, the use of a response or
     rights orientation in resolving moral dilemmas, self-description,
     or perceptions of dependence and independence. In other words,
     the data demonstrated stronger convergence between the genders
     than divergence. Also, there was a close connection between students’
     self description as connected and their use of response orientation
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     in resolving their real life moral dilemma. And there was a close
     connection between the students’ self description as separate or
     objective and the use of rights orientation in resolving their real life
     moral dilemma. (Lyons, 1996, p. 111)
Differences in Moral Reasoning
                 Analyses of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development by Gilligan
                 concluded that females generally do not pass the middle stage of
                 moral development. Thus, instead of reaching stage 4, law and
                 order, as many males do, women only reach stage 3 where the
                 conception of justice is integrated with a conception of a good
      interpersonal relationship. (Lyons, 1996, p. 44)
As mentioned before, Gilligan (1982) asserts the very basis of Kohlberg’s
framework—the focus on the development of justice reasoning—reflects a male way of
looking at things as Kohlberg developed his stages on the basis of male subjects’
reasoning only. She believes this constitutes a bias against females in the
instrumentation and scoring procedures. According to Gilligan, women score lower
than men on Kohlberg’s moral reasoning test as women prefer the lower stages
(particularly Stage 3) or care-based stages. Kohlberg, on the other hand, sees stage 3 as
functional for housewives and mothers (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). He believes
women’s development would morally mature “when they are challenged to solve moral
problems that require them to see beyond the relationships that have in the past
generally bound their moral experience” (Lyons, 1996, p. 45). Therefore, according to
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Kohlberg, if women, like men, were to obtain higher status jobs and more education,
they too would rise to the postconventional level (Hekman, 1995) as higher education
and job experience provide perspective-taking opportunities for women and introduce
them to social issues that extend beyond interpersonal relationships to entire political
and social affiliations (Gilligan & Wiggins).
Research Findings in the U.S.
Walker (1994) reviewed a total of 54 North American studies that compared the
development of moral judgment between the genders using the MJI and found the
following results: the sex differences in moral reasoning were rare in childhood and
early adolescence. When they occurred, most studies in which sex differences were
obtained indicated more mature development for females. However, these differences
were small. Sex differences were rare in late adolescence and youth, as was the case
earlier in development. And when they occurred, most studies in which sex differences
were obtained indicated more mature development for males. However, these
differences were small. Only a minority of studies indicated sex differences in moral
reasoning in adulthood, and even in those studies the differences tended to be small.
When education and/or occupation were controlled, sex differences in moral reasoning
disappeared.
In 1984 Thoma (as cited in Gielen, 1996) conducted a meta-analysis on DIT
data including 56 samples. His review showed overall and at every age/education level
females received significantly higher scores than males. However, the magnitude of
difference was small.
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Studies conducted in the 1990s also indicated more mature development for
females. Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, and Van Court (1995) did longitudinal research
with 17- to 18- and 19- to 20-year olds. Their results showed females’ overall reasoning
was higher than males’. Beller and Stoll (1995) examined cognitive moral reasoning of
high school student athletes and their nonathlete peers. Females scored significantly
higher than males.
Research Findings in Other Cultures
Snarey (1985), in his review of cross-cultural studies on Kohlberg’s stages,
observed that only 3 of the 17 studies reported gender differences. English male
students (ages 11 to 14) were observed to be more advanced than their female peers in
moral reasoning. The German study did not show any significant overall difference;
however, female university students were found to be more likely than male students to
exhibit Stage 3 reasoning (other studies conducted with university students – Finland,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Taiwan – did not find significant gender
differences). In India, two studies did not find any sex differences and one did.
However, the latter study used a less reliable scoring system than the other two studies.
Therefore, according to Snarey, the evidence against gender differences in moral
reasoning in India is stronger.
Even though Moon (1986) in his review of cross-cultural studies on the DIT
observed significant gender differences in many studies, the magnitude of the
differences was small. Moon observed that most of the Chinese and Korean studies
show sex differences in P-scores and Stage 4 scores. In these studies female students
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received higher P-scores but lower Stage 4 scores than did males. English female high
school students received higher Stage 3 scores than their male counterparts. There were
no significant sex differences in P-scores in the American and Australian samples.
As a result of their review of cross-cultural studies on the DIT, Gielen and
Markoulis (1994) reported no significant sex differences in P-scores in the Belize
(sample: adolescents – ages 12 to 19), Trinidad-Tobago (sample: adolescents and
college students), Kuwait (sample: high school, college, and university students), Sudan
(sample: high school, college, and university students), Greece (sample: adolescents
and adults – ages 13 to 23), and Poland (sample: high school and college students)
studies. In the Hong Kong (sample: junior high school, senior high school, and college
students), South Korea (sample: junior high school, senior high school, and college
students), and Taiwan (sample: junior high school, senior high school, and college
students) studies, however, females received significantly higher P-scores than did
males. The magnitude of the differences was small.
Cesur (1997) and Tolunay (2001) administered the DIT to Turkish university
students and observed that females’ overall reasoning was higher than males’.
Criticisms On Gilligan
Miller’s Claim-the Ethic of Care Reflects Western Values
According to Miller (1994), Gilligan’s theory does not have sufficient
sensitivity to the role of enculturation processes in development. She argues the
connected view of self and the associated ethic of care “may be reflective of certain
modern Western cultural assumptions and inadequate as characterizations of
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conceptions emphasized in groups that maintain alternative cultural viewpoints”
(Miller, 1994, p. 10). Whereas Gilligan’s theory emphasizes the importance of deep
universals of experience such as the nature of mother/child attachment, it overlooks the
effect of cultural factors that may qualitatively influence the nature of these
experiences, for instance, conceptions of the child or of attachment. Experiences of
attachment and of inequality common across all cultures are presumed to be the most
important environmental influences on development. “In turn, cultural belief systems
are viewed as having no impact on development, apart from their relationship to
gender” (Miller, 1994, p. 10). According to Miller, this failure to see culture as an
independent effect on development confines both the generality and explanatory
adequacy of Gilligan’s model. The ethic of care seems ill equipped to define the
distribution of morality cross-culturally.
     Extending the logic of Gilligan’s argument to diverse cultural
     groups, it would be expected that concepts of self and morality
     would be more similar among individuals of the same gender
     from different cultures than among individuals of different
     genders from the same culture. Such a claim, however, appears
     contradicted by the extensive anthropological and psychological
     evidence documenting marked culturally based differences in the
     views of self held among individuals from the United States as
     contrasted with from various non-Western cultures. If Gilligan’s
     theory is treated as applicable only to American populations it
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     appears incomplete in that it fails to consider the ways in which
     gender-related experiences may be affected by the larger cultural
     context in which they occur. It cannot be assumed that whereas
     American males’ views of self and morality are both shaped and
     supported by the individualism of the larger culture, American
     females’ views of self and morality develop autonomously and
     only stand opposed to the values of the dominant culture. Just as
     the morality of justice developed among Americans reflects the
     individualism of the larger culture, it would be expected that the
     morality of caring developed among Americans also reflects
     aspects of this individualism. (Miller, 1994, p. 11)
Turiel’s View on Childhood Relationships
Like Gilligan, Turiel (1998) also locates the development of justice and care
perspectives in two dimensions of early childhood relationships. Gilligan and Wiggins
(1988) assert attachment/detachment relationships are central social experiences for
girls, whereas equality/inequality relationships are central for boys. However,
according to Turiel, equality/inequality relationships are at least as salient for girls as
for boys.
     Starting within the family, and then in school, and the wider society,
     girls confront unequal treatment in more poignant ways than boys.
     Women, too, experience inequalities and unjust treatment in ways
     that permeate their family and work experiences. Conversely, issues
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     of attachment and detachment may be salient in the experiences of
     boys in ways that go beyond learning separation and individuation.
     For boys, the prominence of groups, cliques, team sports, and gangs
     are evidence of the pull for cooperation, attachments, and solidarity
     pervasive in their experiences. (Turiel, 1998, p. 885)
Therefore, according to Turiel (1998), issues of justice, fairness, individuation,
care, responsiveness, and interdependence coexist in children’s social experiences and
developing judgments.
Kohlberg’s Claim—Justice Reasoning Includes Care
Kohlberg accepts the presence of a care perspective in people’s moral thinking
(Brown et al., 1995) “but rejects Gilligan’s contention that this phenomenon requires a
new approach to moral theory” (Hekman, 1995, p. 28). According to Kohlberg, care is
included in justice reasoning (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1994), and both the care and the
justice voices are represented in the postconventional level. He claims most of the
moral dilemmas do not pose a choice between the orientations, but “almost always call
out a response which integrates the two orientations” (Spiecker, 1994, p. 298).
Walker et al. (1987) found results supporting Kohlberg’s ideas. Their research
results showed individuals, who reason at the highest level in Kohlberg’s moral stages,
“tend to be split in their moral orientations-to evidence substantial amounts of both
response and rights reasoning” (Walker et al., 1987, p. 856-857).
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The Comparison of Justice and Care Perspectives
According to the justice perspective, self is attained through separation
(Gilligan, 1982) and is seen as individualistic (Koehn, 1998). Therefore, the ethic of
justice gives importance to autonomy and its considerations are individuals and
preserving of individual rights. According to the care perspective, on the other hand,
self is attained through connection (Gilligan) and is seen as relational (Koehn).
Therefore, the ethic of care gives importance to interdependence, and its considerations
are relationships and promoting the welfare of others (Lyons, 1988).
In the justice perspective, individuals try to avoid hurting others by respecting
their rights. Individuals defending the justice perspective recognize their actions can
affect others. Therefore, in this perspective, responsibility means to limit the behavior,
in other words, avoid aggressive and manipulative behavior which can violate the rights
of others. In the care perspective, individuals try to avoid hurting others by being
sensitive to their needs. Individuals defending the care perspective recognize they have
relationships relying on interdependence and that others count on them. Therefore, in
this perspective, responsibility means to meet others’ expectations and be responsive to
their particular needs (Gilligan, 1982).
“An assumption of the justice perspective is that others are the same as the self”
(Lyons, 1988, p. 33). Therefore, the consideration of treating others as you would like
to be treated is given priority in this perspective. Consequently, the justice perspective
gives importance to reciprocity to be able to provide fairness (Gilligan, 1982). The goal
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is to ensure equality among individuals (Baier, 1995). Thus, in this perspective,
individuals try to resolve conflicts in ways that would result in justice. Moral maturity
is defined as justice reasoning (Koehn, 1998).
“An assumption of the care perspective is that others are different from oneself”
(Lyons, 1988, p. 34). Therefore, the consideration of treating people the way they need
to be treated is given priority in this perspective. Consequently, the care perspective
gives importance to seeing the situation in its context and perceiving people in their
own terms to be able to identify and understand their particular needs (Walker, 1995).
The goal is to preserve relationships (Gilligan, 1982). Therefore, in this perspective,
individuals try to resolve conflicts “in ways that would repair and strengthen webs of
relationships” (Jaggar, 1991, p. 82). Moral maturity is defined as being able to make
and maintain relationships (Gilligan).
In the justice perspective, to be able to treat everybody the same (Hoffman,
1994) requires being impartial and objective in moral judgments. These necessitate
autonomous thinking and, thus, distance in relationships (Koehn, 1998). Therefore,
attachment, which is seen as the marker of mature moral judgment in the care
perspective, is perceived as the failure to treat others fairly, as equals and constitutes a
moral problem in the justice perspective (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). In the care
perspective, to be able to treat everybody the way each needs to be treated (Lyons,
1988) requires being partial and subjective in moral judgments. This necessitates
looking at situations from the interdependent perspective and, thus, intimacy in
relationships (Gilligan, 1982). Therefore, detachment, which is seen as the marker of
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mature moral judgment in the justice perspective, is perceived as the failure to attend to
need and constitutes a moral problem in the care perspective (Gilligan & Attanucci).
According to the justice perspective, all rational beings are alike and they follow
the same course of action in resolving moral conflicts (Koehn, 1998). Therefore,
individuals use the moral system of abstract rules and universal principles that apply to
all situations and societies in resolving their competing claims to justice (Colby &
Damon, 1994). They “need not consult with others in the applications of these
principles” (Koehn, 1998, p. 21). This perspective “creates links between persons, who
are assumed to be fundamentally in conflict regarding their rights” (Colby & Damon,
1994, p. 278-279). Therefore, the ethic of justice is tied to formal and abstract situations
and relationships (Tronto, 1994). According to the care perspective, on the other hand,
everyone’s life and needs are different and, thus, every conflict may necessitate a
different solution. Universal rules are seen as insufficient in finding particular solutions
to particular situations. Therefore, in this perspective, individuals do not appeal to the
moral system of abstract rules in resolving conflicts. Instead, they try to understand
each other’s feelings and thoughts and solve moral conflicts through conversation
(Koehn). The care perspective gives importance to others’ concerns and reasoning in
solving problems. It is important to create a solution responsive to the needs of all
involved  (Gilligan, 1988) or find a solution that is the least painful alternative for all
involved (Lyons, 1988). Therefore, the ethic of care is tied to concrete and particular
circumstances. In other words, this morality is grounded in the daily experiences and
moral problems of real people in their everyday lives (Tronto).
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The justice perspective perceives moral conflict as conflict of rights (Siegel,
1986). In other words, individuals experience conflict when they are confused about
how conflicting rights are to be prioritized or about which acts will be more effective in
the protection of individual rights and justice (Gilligan, 1988). The care perspective
perceives moral conflict as conflict of responsibilities (Siegel). In other words,
individuals experience conflict when they are confused about whose needs should be
met first. Particularly, the conflict is experienced when there is confusion on whether
the individual’s needs or the needs of others should be prioritized (Gilligan, 1982). 
An individual defending the justice perspective sees her/his relationships with
others from an  inequality/equality perspective. Therefore, s/he focuses on the
vulnerability of people to oppression. An individual defending the care perspective sees
her/his relationships with others from an attachment/detachment or
connection/disconnection perspective. Therefore, s/he focuses on the vulnerability of
people to isolation and abandonment (Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller, & Argyris,
1994).
An individual defending the justice perspective believes emotions ruin
impartiality and prevent people from making decisions which ensure equality. For this
reason, in this perspective, reason, not emotion, is taken as a guide in moral judgments
(Gilligan, 1982). Therefore, individuals believing in the justice perspective “view moral
conflicts as abstract, logical problems concerning rights and rules” (Friedman,
Robinson, & Friedman, 1994, p. 285). An individual defending the care perspective
believes logical reasoning prevents people from seeing others in their own terms, from
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being responsive to others’ particular needs, and causes disconnection among people.
For this reason, in the care perspective, emotions such as empathy, compassion, and
love, not reason, are taken as guides in moral judgments (Gilligan).
Social Structure and Gender Equality in Turkey
After the Republic was founded in Turkey in 1923, radical attempts were
undertaken to improve the status of women and, thus, to promote gender equality (Arat,
1994). The founders of the new regime “aimed to establish a liberal Western society,
secular as well as democratic, in Turkey” (Arat, 1994, p. 243). Therefore, development
and modernization in Turkey were defined as Westernization. In 1926, the Republic of
Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Code as the basis of its Civil Law that included Family
Law. As a result, “compared to their counterparts in other developing countries,
especially those in the Muslim world, Turkish women have enjoyed considerable civil
and political rights and been more visible in the public domain” (Arat, 1994, p. 57). For
example, with the new Law Turkish women gained several legal rights, such as the
right to choose their own spouses, initiate divorce, and demand child custody.
Furthermore, the Civil Law abolished polygamy, prohibited child marriages by
bringing a minimum age for marriage, and recognized women as legal equals of men in
inheriting and maintaining property (Arat).
In 1930, women gained the right to vote and run in municipal elections, and in
1934, they gained the right to run in national elections. These new rights caused
Turkish women to gain access to education and employment opportunities. “In fact, the
statistical indicators of female representation among professionals in Turkey has been
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more impressive than those in many Western countries” (Arat, 1994, p. 58). In the
1970s, 1 in every 5 lawyers and 1 in every 6 doctors in Turkey was a woman, and
“Turkey ranked third, following the United States and Canada, among all countries in
the world in recruiting women into academia” (Arat, 1994, p. 58).
However, with the effect of conservative groups and Islamic tradition, these
reforms made limited impact on rural areas. Furthermore, as the new “reforms were not
aimed at liberating women, instead of promoting the development of female
consciousness and feminine identity, they strove to equip Turkish women with the
education and finer skills that would improve their contribution to the republican
patriarchy as better wives and mothers” (Arat, 1994, p. 59). The aim of these reforms
was, then, to transform Turkey into a civilized nation acceptable to the West, not to
provide women the opportunity to achieve individual goals. Consequently, in Turkey,
the feminist movement has increasingly gained importance since the 1980s. The goal of
this movement was to promote women’s respectability as individuals, rather than as
mothers, wives, or sisters (Arat).
The women’s movement contributed significantly to the process of
democratization in Turkey during the 1980s. “The movement did not merely give more
women the opportunity to participate in politics, but also helped create the political
milieu conducive to the establishment of a political democracy” (Arat, 1994, p. 241). In
2001, with the help of this movement, the articles that reflect male dominance in
marriage were abolished from the Law (e.g., man is the head of the union of marriage;
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the right and responsibility of deciding the place of residence belongs to the husband;
upon marriage, the wife has to use the husband’s family name).
Despite all these new reforms and movements, in today’s Turkey, women have
limited interest to both education and employment compared to men. In fact, research
shows the education level of women in Turkey is much below that of men.
Furthermore, even among the educated women, participation in the labor force has been
observed to be small. Women working outside the home do so to contribute to the
economic needs of the family. However, most of these working women do not have
financial independence. Therefore, it can be said that in Turkey women are usually in
subordinate and vulnerable positions relative to men (Arat, 1994). However, more and
more women in Turkey are becoming financially and individually independent
everyday, and during the last decade, the role of the Turkish woman has increased all
the way to Prime Minister.
Anthropological and psychological studies characterized “traditional Turkish
culture as a group-oriented culture, with tightly knit social networks and little place for
personal initiative.” Therefore Turkish people can be expected to reflect collectivist
values. However, Turkish society is rapidly shifting from a traditional, agrarian culture
into a modern, urbanized nation (Phalet & Claeys, 1993).
     Studies of modern Turkish culture suggest integration of old
     collectivist group loyalties with new individualistic achievement.
     Although traditional group orientation is apparently preserved
     in high familism and transferred to new national and private
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     organizations, evidence is found for increased achievement
     motivation in modern Turkish youth, together with more
     internal control and future orientation. (Phalet & Claeys, 1993, p. 322)
In fact, Phalet and Claeys (1993) in their study on Turkish and Belgian youth
observed that independence, freedom, and responsibility were among the most
preferred values in Turkish youth. This finding suggests that “modern Turkish youth
opens a perspective on integration of individualistic and collectivist values” (Phalet &
Claeys, 1993, p. 322).
Purpose of the Study
As mentioned in the literature review section, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982)
examined the moral development of Turkish people between 1964 and 1976 and found
evidence for the universality claim of the moral stages in their work. In fact, the
researchers observed moral growth through the sequence of stages of moral judgment
among Turkish participants. However, Turkish participants showed little evidence of
Stage 5 compared to their U.S. counterparts. The first aim of this study is to compare
female-US, male-US, female-Turkish, and male-Turkish university student populations
in terms of Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning to assess the significance of cultural
and gender differences, using the DIT as a tool. In Nisan and Kohlberg’s study, the
Turkish sample consisted of only male participants. In this research, females were also
included.
In 1996 Lyons examined justice and care orientations among Turkish university
students and did not find significant differences between males and females in terms of
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the moral orientations in resolving moral dilemmas. The second aim of this study is to
compare and contrast justice and care orientations among female-US, male-US, female-
Turkish, and male-Turkish university student populations to assess the significance of
cultural and gender differences, using the MMO as a tool.
This research is thought to contribute to the scientific world in two aspects.
First, it is the first cross-cultural statistical comparison between Turkish and U.S.
populations using Gilligan’s theory. Second, it compares a Western society (U.S.) with
a non-Western society (Turkey) in terms of both moral reasoning and moral orientation
using both genders (male and female).
Hypotheses
(1) Based on the lack of clear results regarding cultural differences in moral
stages in the literature, it is hypothesized that in both the US and Turkish cultures, the
moral reasoning of both males and females will reflect Kohlberg’s stages 2, 3, 4, 5A,
5B, and 6.  Therefore, there will be no significant (p>.05) difference based on culture in
the stage scores for moral reasoning as measured by the DIT-short form.
      (2) Based on the evidence in the literature previously cited that females tend to
yield higher P-scores than do males, it is hypothesized that the Stage 5A and 5B mean
scores for females will be significantly (p<.05) higher than the Stage 5A and 5B mean
scores for males as measured by the DIT-short form.
      (3) Based on the evidence in the literature previously cited that males tend to
yield higher Stage 4 scores than do females, it is hypothesized that the mean score of
Stage 4 reasoning for males as measured by the DIT-short form will be significantly
85
(p<.05) higher than the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning for females.
(4) Based on the evidence regarding cultural and gender differences in
postconventional reasoning cited in the literature, it is hypothesized that there will be a
significant (p<.05) difference in postconventional reasoning measured by the P-score
on the DIT-short form as a function of gender (male, female) and culture (Turkish,
U.S.).
(5) Based on the evidence previously reviewed in the literature, it is
hypothesized that there will be a significant (p<.05) interaction effect based on culture
(Turkish, U.S.) and gender (male, female) for the justice orientation as measured by the
MMO. Subhypotheses include:
a) There will be a significant (p<.05) main effect for culture such that U.S.
participants will have higher justice scores than the Turkish participants.
b) There will be a significant (p<.05) main effect for gender such that male
participants will have higher justice scores than the female participants.
(6) Based on the evidence previously reviewed in the literature, there will be a
significant (p<.05) interaction effect based on culture (Turkish, U.S.) and gender (male,
female) for the care orientation as measured by the MMO. Subhypotheses include:
c) There will not be a main effect for culture as there will be no difference in
the care scores of the U.S. and Turkish participants.
d) There will be a significant (p<.05) main effect for gender such that female
participants will have higher care scores than the male participants.
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CHAPTER   2
METHODOLOGY
Sample
A total of 324 Turkish and U.S. university students participated in this cross-
cultural study. The Turkish sample consisted of 193 undergraduate students between
the ages of 18 and 33 (freshmen – 5, sophomores – 92, juniors – 36, seniors – 33) (27
participants did not report their classification). There were 66 males (34.2%) and 125
females (64.8%) (2 participants did not report their gender—1%), with an average age
of 20.69 years. Turkish participants were recruited from 3 universities in Ankara:
Hacettepe University (Department of American Culture and Literature—7 males-31
females), Ankara University (Department of Psychological Studies in Education—27
males-59 females), and the Middle East Technical University (Department of Foreign
Language Education—32 males-35 females). The sample from Turkey included 59
participants from İç Anadolu region, 30 participants from Ege, 28 from Akdeniz, 27
from Marmara, 21 from Karadeniz, 6 from Doğu Anadolu, 5 from Güney Doğu
Anadolu, 1 from Orta Anadolu, 2 from Cyprus, 1 from Kyrgyzstan, and 1 from
Tajikistan (12 participants did not report the region in which they lived). A total of 155
of the participants came from an “urban area” (80.3%), 26 came from a “town”
(13.5%), and 9 came from a “rural area” (4.7%) (3 participants did not complete this
item—1.6%).
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A total of 115 Turkish participants reported family income as “less than $6000”
(59.6%), 70 as “$6000-17,000” (36.3%), and 5 as “over $17,000” (2.6%) (3 participants
did not report family income—1.6%). The majority of the Turkish participants reported
their fathers’ education level as having completed a college degree (62) and their
mothers’ education level as having completed only elementary school (82). Most of the
Turkish participants’ mothers (131) were homemakers and fathers (35) were self-
employed.
The U.S. sample consisted of 131 undergraduate students between the ages of
18 and 46 (freshmen – 22, sophomores – 39, juniors – 45, seniors – 20) (5 participants
did not report their classification). There were 12 males (9.2%) and 113 females
(86.3%) (6 participants did not report their gender—4.6%), with an average age of
21.73 years. U.S. participants were recruited from the Department of Counseling,
Development, and Higher Education at the University of North Texas. The sample
obtained in the U.S. included 98 participants from Texas (74.8%), 4 participants from
Oklahoma, 3 from Virginia, 2 from Arkansas, 2 from Florida, 2 from Minnesota, 2
from New Jersey, 1 from Kansas, 1 from Mississippi, 1 from Nebraska, 1 from Illinois,
2 from Japan, 1 from India, 1 from Spain, and 1 from England (9 participants did not
complete this item). Almost all U.S. participants came from an “urban area.” Only 3
participants reported family income as “less than $10,000,” 15 as “$10-19,000,” 18 as
“$20-40,000,” 45 as “$45-100,000,” and 11 as “$110-200,000” (39 participants did not
report family income). The majority of the U.S. participants reported both their fathers’
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and mothers’ education level as having completed high school (60 and 68,
respectively). Most of the U.S. participants’ mothers (29) were homemakers and fathers
(20) were in management.
The mean age for the entire sample was 21.11 years, and most of the
participants were sophomores (131) (freshmen – 27, juniors – 81, seniors – 53). Both
Turkish and the U.S. samples included students from lower class-to upper-middle-class
families. However, it was observed that compared to the Turkish participants, most of
the U.S. participants had higher family incomes.
Instruments
Instruments for this study included the Defining Issues Test (the DIT-short
form) (Rest, 1986) and the Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) (Liddell et al., 1992).
In addition, each participant completed a consent form and a demographic
questionnaire.
The Defining Issues Test
The DIT-short form is an objective multiple choice test originally stemming
from Kohlberg’s work on the development of moral reasoning (Moon, 1986). Like
most other tests of moral judgment, the DIT is concerned with making judgments about
moral problems. It is not only interested in what line of action subjects favor (i.e., to
steal or not steal a drug), but also interested in subjects’ reasons underlying their
decisions (Rest, 1986).
The DIT-short form consists of 3 dilemma stories. For each moral dilemma, the
DIT includes 12 item statements that can be used to resolve the problem. The items
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reflect different moral stages (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994). After reading each story,
subjects are expected to read each item and to rate its importance in their decision-
making process. After rating each item individually, subjects rank the four most
important items (Rest, 1986).
The DIT provides moral stage scores for Stages 2, 3, 4, 4 1/2, 5A, 5B, and 6.
Preferences for postconventional reasoning (Stages 5A, 5B, and 6, combined) are
represented by the P-score. The P-score expresses the percentage of a participant’s
rankings which fall in the postconventional range (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994). “Stage
5A represents considerations that focus on organizing a society by appealing to
consensus-producing procedures (such as abiding by majority vote), insisting on due
process (giving everyone his day in court), and safeguarding minimal basic rights”
(Rest & Narvaez, 1998, p. 19). Stage 5B/6, on the other hand, includes “considerations
that focus on organizing social arrangements and relationships in terms of intuitively
appealing ideals” (Rest & Narvaez, 1998, p. 19). According to Kohlberg, 5B reasoners
“have a keener appreciation of the prescriptive and universalizable nature of moral
judgments” (Lapsley, 1996, p. 66); therefore, they are more likely to exhibit moral
behavior they believe to be just.
     The DIT contains 3 validity and consistency checks to establish
     whether the person taking the test understands it and is reasonably
     careful in filling it out. Among the 72 items, there are a few
      “meaningless” items (M-items) based upon lofty sounding, but
      senseless statements. Respondents endorsing a number of the
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      pretentious sounding, but meaningless moral arguments are
                  frequently removed from the research sample. A second checking
                  procedure looks for consistency between items rated high and
                  items ranked high. A third checking procedure determines whether
                  a protocol reflects response sets on the rating task. Should there be
                  too many “inconsistent” respondents in a cross-cultural study, the
                  researcher may suspect a lack of cultural-cognitive fit between the
                  task requirements and/or moral conceptions underlying the DIT
                  and the minds of the respondents. (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994, p. 80)
As mentioned in the literature review section, the DIT is the most frequently
used moral judgment measure in the moral development literature (Gielen, 1996). The
reliability and validity of the DIT were demonstrated to be very good in America. It had
a high test-retest reliability (.82 and .77 for 6-and 3-story forms, respectively) and
internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .77 and .76 for 6-and 3-story forms,
respectively) (Moon, 1986).
To determine criterion group validity, Rest (1986) used the DIT on the most
sophisticated group (a group of Ph.D. students in moral philosophy and political
science) and on the youngest and least educated group (ninth graders) that could take
the test. The expectation was the scores of the doctoral students would be higher than
those of the ninth graders. Indeed, group differences were highly statistically
significant, consistent with Rest’s expectations. In general, junior high students’ DIT
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scores average in the 20s, senior high students average in the 30s, college students in
the 40s, students in professional school programs in the 50s, and moral
philosophy/political science PhD students in the 60s.
Rest (1986) conducted several longitudinal studies to examine whether there
would be change in the direction of higher stages for subjects who were retested.
Results indicated significant upward trends over 4 years at 3 testings (F = 20.1, p<
.001) for P-scores. Similarly, analyses of individual patterns of change indicated an
upward trend. Both cohort-sequential and time-sequential analyses showed this upward
movement could not result from cultural change, testing effects, or sampling bias, but
rather resulted from individual ontogenetic change.
To establish convergent-divergent correlations, several studies were conducted.
Results showed the correlations with other measures of moral reasoning (various
versions of Kohlberg’s test and the Comprehension of Moral Concepts test) ranged in
the .60s and .70s. The correlations were in the .20s to .50s range with other measures of
cognitive development and intelligence. The correlations were mostly non-significant
or inconsistent with various measures of attitudes and personality. Similarly, the
correlations were usually non-significant or very low with demographic or sociological
variables such as sex, socioeconomic class, and political party (Rest, 1986).
As mentioned in the literature review section, in 1986 Moon reviewed cross-
cultural studies using the DIT. In the studies conducted in Brazil, Greece, Iceland,
Israel, and Korea the short version was used. In the study completed in Brazil, test-
retest reliability was low (r = .39). in the Korean study, however, the reliability of the
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DIT was high (r = .69). The remaining 3 studies did not provide any information about
the reliability of their research. Among the studies using the long version of the DIT,
only the studies completed in Australia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines provided
information about the reliability of their data. The DIT used in Hong Kong had a low
test-retest reliability (r = .32). The reliability of the DIT used in Australia (r = .98) and
the Philippines (r = .74) was high. Only 2 studies reported internal consistency
measures. Alpha was .50 for the Hong Kong sample and .66 for the Australian sample.
The Measure of Moral Orientation
The Measure of Moral Orientation is a paper-and-pencil objective test. It has
been developed to measure a participants’ moral orientations for care, as stressed by
Gilligan, or justice, as stressed by Kohlberg (Liddell et al., 1992).
The Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) consists of 2 parts. The first part
includes 9 stories in each of which a young adult is placed in conflict. Each story has a
different number of items. After reading each story, subjects are expected to read each
item and indicate to what degree they agree or disagree with that item. The second part
is composed of a self-description questionnaire that contains 14 (7 self-justice and 7
self-care) items. In this part, subjects are also expected to read each item and indicate to
what degree they agree or disagree with that item (Liddell et al., 1992). The MMO
consists of “35” care items and “34” justice items. However, one of the “care” items
(no. 26) was accidentally omitted during the translation process. For that reason, this
item was omitted from the overall care score for both the Turkish and U.S. participants
in this study.
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The analyses completed to determine the reliability and validity of the Measure
of Moral Orientation can be summarized as follows:
“An estimate of internal consistency reliability, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha,
was computed for each of the four scales of the Measure of Moral Orientation as well
as the thinking-feeling scale of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator” (Liddell et al., 1992,
p. 328). The alpha coefficient was .59 for self-care, .60 for self-justice, .84 for care, and
.73 for justice. Internal consistency reliability estimates obtained for the Measure of
Moral Orientation were found to be comparable to or better than those indicated for
other instruments measuring moral development. For the thinking-feeling scale of the
Myers- Briggs Type Indicator, estimates were found to be consistent with published
reports for that instrument (Liddell et al.).
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were computed to establish
convergent validity. The correlation between justice and self-justice was .22, and the
correlation between care and self-care was .32. Again, Pearson product moment
correlation coefficients were computed to establish discriminant validity (i.e., the
probability of an instrument’s discriminating between dissimilar traits). The correlation
between justice and care was .17; between self-justice and self-care, –.44; and between
thinking and feeling on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,  –.92. As there was an almost
perfect negative correlation between the thinking and feeling scores, it was decided to
use only one of the two scores from the thinking-feeling scale. The thinking score was
applied as the only covariate in all analyses because internal consistency reliability was
found to be higher for the thinking scale (r = .85) than for the feeling scale (r = .76),
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and  “the thinking scale correlated more highly with the criterion of care (r = -.38)”
(Liddell et al., 1992, p. 329). The scales were considered to be independent of each
other as the correlations between different traits were found to be relatively low and,
thus, the instrument was considered to be correctly discriminating between unlike
scales (Liddell et al.).
The demographic questionnaire used in this study included questions about the
participant’s age, gender, marital status, major, family income, parents’ occupation,
level of education, and marital status. The consent form, demographic questionnaire,
and the instruments used with the Turkish university students were printed in Turkish.
They were translated by a teacher who worked in the Department of English as a
Foreign Language Education of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara,
Turkey. The translations of the DIT and MMO were later compared with the originals
by a Turkish person who did his PhD in the United States.
After the translation of the DIT was done, it was found that another Turkish
version of the DIT had been previously developed. The older Turkish version, which
was translated by Sevim Cesur, a graduate student in Turkey, was used in a study
comparing the moral reasoning of Turkish male and female university students and
provided valid results (Cesur, 1997). In light of this new information, the author
compared both Turkish versions of the DIT and communicated with Sevim Cesur to
ensure changes to the new version reflected superior sections of Sevim Cesur’s
translation. This way, the author believed the Turkish version used in this study is an
improved Turkish translation of the DIT.
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Procedures
The UNT Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved all instruments,
questionnaires, and consent forms utilized in this study prior to the beginning of data
collection.
The principal investigator (PI) neither collected the data nor recruited the
students in person in Turkey. Instead, the university instructors whose students were
used as subjects for the research helped the PI collect the data. U.S. students were also
collected through contacts with instructors. Following approval of course instructors,
both U.S. and Turkish students were given a packet of materials containing the consent
form, the demographic questionnaire, and the instruments (the DIT and MMO).
Participants were asked to take the packet home, complete the materials, and return the
completed packet to the university instructor. A total of 56 Turkish participants
completed the materials during the regular class-session, while 137 Turkish participants
and all the U.S participants (131) completed the materials at home. After participants
returned the completed packet to their university instructor, materials were forwarded
to the researcher.
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CHAPTER   3
RESULTS
All statistical analyses were done using SPSS for Windows (2001).
The Analyses of The DIT
A total of 193 Turkish university students completed the DIT. However, 18 of
the Turkish participants (10 males and 8 females) did not pass the DIT’s consistency
check. Therefore, they were excluded from analyses, leaving 175 Turkish participants.
A total of 131 U.S. university students completed the DIT. However, 27 of the U.S.
participants (6 males, 20 females, and 1 participant who did not report his/her gender)
did not pass the DIT’s consistency check and were excluded from analyses, leaving 104
U.S participants. As a result, a total of 279 students were included in the analyses of the
DIT (56 Turkish males, 117 Turkish females, and 2 Turkish participants who did not
report their gender – 6 U.S. males, 93 U.S. females, and 5 U.S. participants who did not
report their gender).
The Analyses of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicted that in both the U.S. and Turkish cultures, the moral
reasoning of both males and females would reflect Kohlberg’s stages 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B,
and 6, and there would be no significant (p>.05) difference based on culture in the stage
scores for moral reasoning. The analyses of the DIT-short form showed reasoning
across each of Kohlberg’s moral stages among both genders from both countries,
consistent with the expectations.
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Results of t-test analyses indicated:
(a) The mean score of Stage 2 reasoning of U.S. participants was significantly
(p<.001) higher than the mean score of Stage 2 reasoning of Turkish
participants;
(b) No significant (p>.05) difference in the mean score of Stage 3 reasoning
between U.S. and Turkish participants; however, the p value approached
significance at 0.054;
(c) The mean score of Stage 4 reasoning of U.S. participants was significantly
(p<.001) higher than the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning of Turkish
participants;
(d) The mean score of Stage 5A reasoning of Turkish participants was
significantly (p<.01) higher than the mean score of Stage 5A reasoning of
U.S. participants;
(e) The mean score of Stage 5B reasoning of Turkish participants was
significantly (p<.001) higher than the mean score of Stage 5B reasoning of
U.S. participants;
(f) No significant (p>.05) difference in the mean score of Stage 6 reasoning
between U.S. and Turkish participants (see Table 1).
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Table 1
T-test results for Hypothesis 1.
Group           n            Mean          s.d.          df              t            p
Stage 2               U.S.             104         5.33           4.81      159.87      -5.52      .000
Turkey         175         2.39           3.26
Stage 3                        U.S.             104        12.29           8.07       277          1.93      .054
Turkey        175        14.23           8.16
Stage 4 U.S.            104         22.45           9.66       277         -6.33     .000
Turkey        175        15.46       8.45
Stage 5A U.S.            104        10.83            7.16       277         3.45      .001
Turkey        175        13.78            6.79
Stage 5B U.S.        104          1.37            2.56      263.46     8.82      .000
Turkey        175          4.56            3.44
Stage 6 U.S.            104          2.95            3.55       277         .728      .467
Turkey        175         3.25             3.37
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The Analyses of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted the Stage 5A and Stage 5B mean scores for females
would be significantly (p<.05) higher than the Stage 5A and Stage 5B mean scores for
males. A total of 272 participants (62 males and 210 females) were used in the stage
comparisons of the two genders.
Results of t-test analyses indicated:
(a) No significant (p>.05) difference in the mean score of Stage 5A reasoning
between male and female participants.
(b) No significant (p>.05) difference in the mean score of Stage 5B reasoning
between male and female participants (see Table 2).
Table 2
 T-test results for Hypothesis 2.
Gender           n            Mean          s.d.          df              t            p
______________________________________________________________________
Stage 5A               Male              62          12.08          6.31         270        -.967    .334
Female        210          13.06        7.25
Stage 5B                      Male             62           3.90           3.56         270         1.23    .221
Female        210           3.27           3.48
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The Analyses of Hypothesis 3
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning for males
would be significantly (p<.05) higher than the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning for
females. However, results of t-test analyses indicated no significant (p>.05) difference
in the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning between male and female participants (see Table
3).
Table 3
 T-test results for Hypothesis 3.
Gender           n            Mean          s.d.          df              t            p
______________________________________________________________________
Stage 4              Male              62          16.75          8.38         270        -1.15    .250
Female        210          18.34        9.86
The Analyses of Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted there would be a significant (p<.05) difference in
postconventional reasoning based on gender (male, female) and culture (Turkish, U.S.).
Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA indicated a significant (p<.05) main effect in
postconventional reasoning based on culture, but no main effect for gender (p>.05). The
interaction effect was also not significant (p>.05) (see Table 4).
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Table 4
ANOVA results for Hypothesis 4.
DIT P-score by culture and gender
df                F              η              p
Culture (C)                  1             13.32          .22          .00
Gender (G)                  1              2.25           .09          .14
C  X G                         1              .01             .00          .93
    Error                        268 (206.88)
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
Group means:                         Mean                n
Turkey:                      36.16              173
      males                   32.67                56
      females                37.84              117
US:                            25.42                99
      males                   21.11                  6
                  females           25.69                93
Total:
                  males                  31.56                 62
                  females               32.46               210
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The Analyses of the MMO
The Analyses of Hypotheses 5 and 6
Hypothesis 5 predicted a significant interaction effect based on culture and
gender for the justice orientation. Hypotheses of main effects predicted U.S.
participants would yield significantly (p<.05) higher justice scores than Turkish
participants and male participants would yield significantly (p<.05) higher justice
scores than female participants. Hypothesis 6 predicted a significant interaction effect
based on culture and gender for the care orientation. Hypotheses of main effects
predicted no main effect for culture, but main effects for gender such that female
participants would yield significantly (p<.05) higher care scores than male participants.
Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA indicated there was not a significant (p>.05)
interaction effect for the justice orientation based on culture and gender. However,
results did indicate significant (p<.001) main effects for both culture and gender,
indicating Turkish participants scored significantly higher on the justice orientation
than the U.S. participants and females scored significantly higher on the justice
orientation than the males.
Similarly, results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA indicated there was not a significant
(p>.05) interaction effect for the care orientation based on culture and gender.
However, results did indicate significant (p<.001) main effects for both culture and
gender, indicating Turkish participants scored significantly higher on the care
orientation than the U.S. participants and females scored significantly higher on the
care orientation than the males (see Tables 5 and 6).
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Table 5
ANOVA results for Hypothesis 5.
Justice score by culture and gender
df F η p
Culture (C) 1 12.65 .20 .00
Gender (G) 1 11.06 .19 .00
C X G 1   .33 .03 .57
    error 308  (77.18)
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
Group means: Mean   n
Turkey: 65.56 191
     males 68.24   66
     females 64.14 125
US: 69.17 121
      males 77.42   12
      females 68.59 109
Total:
        males 69.19   78
       females 66.21 234
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
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Table 6
 ANOVA results for Hypothesis 6.
Care score by culture and gender
                       df                         F                    η                    p
Culture (C) 1 19.23 .24 .00
Gender (G) 1 18.44 .24 .00
C X G 1   .01 .00 .92
    error 308  (107.75)
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
Group means: Mean  n
Turkey: 62.82 191   
      males                     67.67                 66
      females 60.26 125
US: 68.60 121
      males 75.58   12
      females 67.83 109
Total:
        males 68.88   78
       females 63.79 234
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
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CHAPTER   4
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
This study compared American and Turkish university students in terms of
moral orientation (justice and care) and Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning to be able
to assess the influence of culture and gender on moral development. This study was
conducted with university students in order to better control for level of education.
Without controlling the education level of participants, unbiased sampling becomes
difficult and educational differences may influence moral reasoning and orientation
significantly.
Results of this study may be analyzed in terms of cultural and gender
differences. With regard to cultural differences, based on the lack of clear results
regarding cultural differences in moral stages in the literature, Hypothesis 1 predicted
no significant difference in the mean score of moral reasoning of Stages 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B,
and 6 between U.S. and Turkish populations. Hypothesis 1 implied cultural differences
between U.S. and Turkish societies were not significant factors on moral reasoning of
university students included in this study.
However, results of this study did not entirely confirm Hypothesis 1. While
there was no significant difference in the mean score of Stage 3 and Stage 6 reasoning
between U.S. and Turkish participants, U.S. participants did have significantly higher
Stage 2 and Stage 4 scores than the Turkish participants.  Further, the Turkish
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participants had significantly higher Stage 5A and Stage 5B scores than the U.S.
participants. Overall, these findings indicate culture may be a significant factor
influencing moral reasoning for the participants in this study.
Research shows the United States is the most individualistic culture in the world
(Kozan & Ergin, 1998). “Individualist cultures emphasize values that serve the self by
making the self feel good, be distinguished, and be independent” (Schwartz, 1990, p.
140). In these societies personal goals are given priority over the goals of the in-group.
Collectivist cultures, on the other hand, “emphasize values that serve the in-group by
subordinating personal goals for the sake of preserving in-group integrity,
interdependence of members, and harmonious relationships” (Schwartz, 1990, p. 140).
Traditional Turkish culture is characterized as a group-oriented culture reflecting
collectivistic values (Phalet & Claeys, 1993). Therefore, traditional Turkish people
might be expected to reflect more Stage 3 morality which emphasizes affection,
conformity, and loyalty within a primary group (Ma & Cheung, 1996) compared to
American people. No significant difference in Stage 3 reasoning between cultures for
the participants in this study is a surprising result given that Turkey is a collectivist and
the U.S is an individualist society.
However, this study was carried out with university students. As mentioned in
the literature review section, modern Turkish youth has been observed to carry signs of
both individualism and collectivism (Kozan & Ergin, 1998). In fact, Phalet and Claeys
(1993) found individualistic self-realization, freedom, independence, and responsibility
were among the most preferred values in modern Turkish youth. This suggests Turkish
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youth may tend to give priority to personal goals over group goals, which is in
contradiction with Stage 3 morality. When the university students included in this
sample are considered as the modern, educated youth in Turkey, Phalet and Claeys’s
research results are consistent with the findings reported here.
In individualist societies such as the U.S, individuals “maintain each other’s
individualistic interest in the socially conventional and legal context” (Ma & Cheung,
1996, p. 703). Therefore, law is very important and it is utilized in the resolution of
conflicts. The U.S. government has been strong in enforcing the law, and the U.S. legal
system has been strong in providing justice. The author believes both factors play roles
in the creation of a justice seeking and law abiding culture. The author also believes
that, in comparison to the U.S., Turkish law enforcement and legal system have not
been as strong; therefore, law and justice have not become such a strong influence to
Turkish culture. For that reason, it can be expected that the U.S. population may reflect
more Stage 4 reasoning, as the results of this study confirm. This finding is consistent
with previous studies that indicate U.S. participants tend to receive higher Stage 4
scores than do participants from collectivistic cultures. In fact, U.S. students were
observed to receive significantly higher Stage 4 scores than students from Hong Kong,
Belize, and Korea (Ma & Cheung, 1996; Gielen, Cruickshank, Johnston, Swanzey, &
Avellani, 1986; Park & Johnson, 1984).
As mentioned before, individualistic societies emphasize the importance of “the
worth, dignity, and autonomy of the individual person, including the subjective self or
inner life of the person” (Lickona, 1991, p. 9). For this reason, these societies tend to
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give priority to rights and freedom more than responsibility and commitment and, thus,
individuals tend to consider and fulfill themselves as free individuals rather than to
meet their obligations as members of groups (Lickona). In other words, in these
societies individuals tend to consider and be responsive primarily to the self’s needs
(Miller, 1994). As the U.S. is an individualistic society (Kozan & Ergin, 1998), the U.S.
population can be expected to reflect more Stage 2 reasoning which represents
“instrumental relativist orientation, where the idea of morally right behavior is confused
with what satisfies one’s own needs” (Park & Johnson, 1984, p. 35), as the results of
this study confirm. This finding is consistent with previous studies that indicate U.S.
participants tend to receive higher Stage 2 scores than do participants from
collectivistic cultures. In fact, U.S. students were observed to receive higher Stage 2
scores than students from Belize, Trinidad, and Korea (Gielen et al., 1986; Park &
Johnson, 1984).
In the literature, there is evidence females tend to yield higher P-scores
(Tolunay, 2001; Cesur, 1997; Gielen, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1995; Beller & Stoll,
1995; Gielen & Markoulis, 1994; Moon, 1986) and males tend to yield higher Stage 4
scores (Moon, 1986). Motivated by these research results, Hypothesis 2 predicted the
mean score of Stage 5A and Stage 5B reasoning of females would be significantly
higher than the mean score of Stage 5A and Stage 5B reasoning of males included in
this sample, and Hypothesis 3 predicted the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning of males
would be significantly higher than the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning of females
included in this sample. Both hypotheses implied a significant gender influence on
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moral reasoning. However, results did not confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3, implying
gender for these subjects was not a significant factor for moral reasoning in Stage 4,
Stage 5A, and Stage 5B. Results indicated no significant difference in the mean score
of Stage 4, Stage 5A, and Stage 5B reasoning between male and female participants in
this study.
To better examine differences in Stage 4, Stage 5A, and Stage 5B reasoning as a
function of culture and gender in this sample, additional analyses were conducted
comparing reasoning between Turkish males, Turkish females, and U.S. females. U.S.
males were removed from analyses due to the small sample (n = 6). Results of the
Oneway ANOVA examining differences in Stage 4 reasoning indicated an overall
significant (p<.001) difference between the 3 groups examined. Results of the Tukey
planned comparisons indicated Stage 4 reasoning of U.S. females was significantly
(p<.001) higher than Stage 4 reasoning of Turkish males and Turkish females.
However, no significant (p>.05) difference was found in the mean score of Stage 4
reasoning between Turkish males and Turkish females.
In addition, results of a Oneway ANOVA indicated an overall significant
difference in Stage 5A (p<.01) and Stage 5B (p<.001) reasoning between the 3 groups
examined. Results of the Tukey planned comparisons indicated the mean score of Stage
5A and Stage 5B reasoning of Turkish females was significantly (p<.05) higher than
the mean score of Stage 5A and Stage 5B reasoning of U.S. females. While no
significant (p>.05) difference was found in the mean score of Stage 5A reasoning
between Turkish males and U.S. females, results indicated that the mean score of Stage
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5B reasoning of Turkish males was significantly (p<.05) higher than the mean score of
Stage 5B reasoning of U.S. females. However, no significant (p>.05) difference was
found in the mean score of Stage 5A and Stage 5B reasoning between Turkish males
and Turkish females (see Tables 7, 8, and 9).
To summarize, no significant difference was found between male and female
participants in Stages 4, 5A, and 5B during testing of the hypotheses. Post hoc analyses,
removing the sample of U.S. males due to the small number (n = 6), indicated there was
no significant difference between Turkish males and Turkish females in Stages 4, 5A,
and 5B. However, post hoc analyses also indicated the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning
of U.S. females was significantly higher than the mean score of Stage 4 reasoning of
Turkish males, while the mean score of Stage 5B reasoning of Turkish males was
significantly higher than the mean score of Stage 5B reasoning of U.S. females. These
findings suggest culture not gender may have a key role in the development of Stages 4,
5A, and 5B for this sample. However, it is also interesting to note that gender
differences between Turkish males and Turkish females did approach significance with
regard to Stage 5A (p = .096) and Stage 5B (p = .073) reasoning.
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Table 7
Results of Oneway ANOVA for Stage 4.
Source                                df                   F                   p                η
Between groups                  2                 21.09             .000            .138
Within groups                   263
Total                                 265
Tukey Planned Comparisons
Groups                              n                   Mean                 s.d.
1 – Turkish males            56                 16.43 a                8.17
2 – Turkish females        117                14.87 a               8.58
3 – U.S. females               93                22.70 b                9.68
Significant differences between groups:                         p
Group 1 vs. Group 2                                                      .524
Group 1 vs. Group 3                                                      .000
Group 2 vs. Group 3                                                      .000
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Table 8
Results of Oneway ANOVA for Stage 5A.
Source                                df                   F                   p                η
Between groups                  2                 5.83             .003            .042
Within groups                   263
Total                                 265
Tukey Planned Comparisons
Groups                              n                   Mean                 s.d.
1 – Turkish males            56                 12.69 ab               6.19
2 – Turkish females        117                14.51 a               6.89
3 – U.S. females               93                11.25 b                7.32
Significant differences between groups:                         p
Group 1 vs. Group 2                                                      .239
Group 1 vs. Group 3                                                      .430
Group 2 vs. Group 3                                                      .002
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Table 9
Results of Oneway ANOVA for Stage 5B.
Source                                df                   F                   p                η
Between groups                  2                 36.19             .000            .216
Within groups                   263
Total                                 265
Tukey Planned Comparisons
Groups                              n                   Mean                 s.d.
1 – Turkish males            56                 3.88 a                 3.59
2 – Turkish females        117                4.89 a                 3.33
3 – U.S. females               93                1.25 b                 2.47
Significant differences between groups:                         p
Group 1 vs. Group 2                                                      .117
Group 1 vs. Group 3                                                      .000
Group 2 vs. Group 3                                                      .000
As mentioned in the literature review section, Gilligan claims Stage 3 represents
females’ moral reasoning, whereas Stage 4 reflects males’ moral reasoning (Lyons,
1996). According to Gilligan (1982), women score lower than men on Kohlberg’s
moral reasoning test as women prefer the lower stages (particularly Stage 3) or care-
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based stages. Analysis of Gilligan’s claim using this sample was conducted in addition
to the hypotheses reviewed earlier to examine differences in Stage 3 reasoning as a
function of culture and gender. U.S. males were removed from analysis due to the small
sample (n = 6).
Results of a Oneway ANOVA indicated an overall significant (p<.05)
difference between the 3 groups examined. Post hoc analyses using Tukey planned
comparisons indicated there was no significant (p>.05) difference in the mean score of
Stage 3 reasoning between Turkish males and Turkish females, whereas the mean score
of Stage 3 reasoning of Turkish males was significantly (p<.01) higher than the mean
score of Stage 3 reasoning of U.S. females. There was also no significant (p>.05)
difference in the mean score of Stage 3 reasoning between Turkish females and U.S.
females (see Table 10). These findings can be said to be in contradiction with previous
studies that indicate females tend to receive higher Stage 3 scores than do males (Moon,
1986; Snarey, 1985), and comparisons among these 3 groups suggest the difference in
Stage 3 reasoning between Turkish males and U.S. females in this study may be a result
of cultural not gender differences.
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Table 10
Results of Oneway ANOVA for Stage 3.
Source                                df                   F                   p                η
Between groups                  2                 3.71             .026            .027
Within groups                   263
Total                                 265
Tukey Planned Comparisons
Groups                              n                   Mean                 s.d.
1 – Turkish males            56                 15.68 a                7.90
2 – Turkish females        117                13.50 ab              8.20
3 – U.S. females               93                11.94 b                8.15
Significant differences between groups:                         p
Group 1 vs. Group 2                                                      .225
Group 1 vs. Group 3                                                      .018
Group 2 vs. Group 3                                                      .350
Hypothesis 4 examined interaction effects between gender and culture in
postconventional reasoning. Results indicated a significant difference in
postconventional reasoning based on culture, but not for gender. In other words, results
indicated Turkish participants exhibited significantly more postconventional reasoning
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than did U.S. participants. However, there was no significant difference in
postconventional reasoning between male and female participants. These results are
consistent with the results obtained from Hypotheses 2 and 3.
As mentioned before, Snarey’s (1985) review of cross-cultural studies on
Kohlberg’s stages showed that in comparison with the scores of the samples from
collectivistic cultures, the American P-scores were about average. In fact, moral
maturity scores of Taiwanese, Israeli Kibbutz, and Indian participants were higher than
those of American participants in one or more age divisions and Turkish urban
participants ranked higher than working-class participants in the U.S. Moon (1986), in
his review of cross-cultural studies on the DIT, on the other hand, found results
contradicting Snarey’s observations. Moon observed samples reflecting the
characteristics of American culture received the highest P-scores. In fact, American
students’ P-scores were higher than their Mexican, Korean, Chinese, and Saudi Arabian
counterparts. As a result of their review of cross-cultural studies on the DIT, Gielen and
Markoulis (1994) observed North American, European, and the East Asian college and
university students received similar P-scores. P-scores of participants from less
developed countries such as Belize, Nigeria, and Trinidad-Tobago were lower than
those of participants from the more industrialized nations in Europe, North America,
and East Asia. To summarize, the existing literature does not provide a definitive
ranking on U.S. postconventional reasoning with respect to other cultures.
A possible explanation to the difference in P-scores between the U.S. and
Turkish participants can be as follows: The collectivistic nature of the traditional
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Turkish culture (Phalet & Claeys, 1993) may enable its individuals to maintain close
relationships and close communication ties with each other and these interconnected
relationships may enable individuals to gain experience in solving difficult social
dilemmas similar to those in the DIT. As Turkish people grow up having such
experiences, being aware of the lives of others, gaining insight into each other’s
perspectives, feelings, and thoughts, the law may become a relatively less important
factor in their social decision-making. In contrast, the more individualistic nature of the
U.S. may leave its individuals relatively inexperienced in dealing with social problems.
As the U.S. has a justice seeking culture (Miller, 1994), individuals may have a
tendency to rely more frequently on matters of law (as reflected in their higher levels of
Stage 4 reasoning) in resolving social dilemmas.
To better examine differences in postconventional reasoning as a function of
culture and gender in this sample, additional analyses were conducted comparing
reasoning between Turkish males, Turkish females, and U.S. females. U.S. males were
removed from analyses due to the small sample (n = 6). Results of a Oneway ANOVA
indicated an overall significant (p<.001) difference in postconventional reasoning.
Results of the Tukey planned comparisons indicated differences in postconventional
reasoning between the Turkish male and Turkish female samples approached
significance (p = .072) in that postconventional reasoning of Turkish females was
slightly higher than that of Turkish males. This result can be said to be consistent with
Cesur (1997) and Tolunay’s (2001) research findings that Turkish female university
students’ overall reasoning was higher than Turkish male university students’. In
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addition, postconventional reasoning of both Turkish males and Turkish females in this
study was significantly (p<.01) higher than postconventional reasoning of U.S. females
(see Table 11). These scores still indicate culture may have a more significant effect
than gender in moral decision-making.
According to the author, Turkish people are very interested in what happens to
others and believe they have moral obligations to others. Helping and self-sacrifice
become a moral duty, are seen as “doing the right thing,” and are highly valued in the
society. The author believes Turkish female university students received the highest P-
scores because they have experience with self-sacrificial and caring relationships in
their own families and they have the education and maturity to generalize these
experiences to any moral dilemma.
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Table 11
Results of Oneway ANOVA for P-score.
Source                                df                   F                   p                η
Between groups                  2                 18.31             .000            .122
Within groups                   263
Total                                 265
Tukey Planned Comparisons
Groups                              n                   Mean                 s.d.
1 – Turkish males            56                 32.67 a               14.05
2 – Turkish females        117                37.83 a               15.17
3 – U.S. females               93                 25.70 b              13.70
Significant differences between groups:                         p
Group 1 vs. Group 2                                                      .072
Group 1 vs. Group 3                                                      .012
Group 2 vs. Group 3                                                      .000
Hypothesis 5 predicted a significant interaction effect based on culture and
gender for the justice orientation. Hypotheses of main effects predicted U.S.
participants would yield significantly higher justice scores than Turkish participants
and male participants would yield significantly higher justice scores than female
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participants. Results indicated Turkish participants scored significantly higher on the
justice orientation than the U.S. participants and females scored significantly higher on
the justice orientation than the males.
Hypothesis 6 predicted a significant interaction effect based on culture and
gender for the care orientation. Hypotheses of main effects predicted no main effect for
culture, but main effects for gender such that female participants would yield
significantly higher care scores than male participants. Results indicated Turkish
participants scored significantly higher on the care orientation than the U.S. participants
and females scored significantly higher on the care orientation than the males.
As mentioned in the literature review section, Shweder et al. (1990) claim
individualistic (Western) cultures have “a moral orientation towards autonomy, rights,
and personal prerogative,” (Neff, 2001, p. 234) while collectivistic (non-Western)
cultures have “a moral orientation towards connectedness, social duty, and
interpersonal responsibility” (Neff, 2001, p. 234). This implies justice reasoning is
more a characteristic of individualistic morality, while care reasoning is more a
characteristic of collectivistic morality (Turiel, 1998). From this point of view, the U.S.
population can be expected to be oriented toward justice reasoning and the Turkish
population can be expected to be oriented toward care reasoning.
In fact, results of hypotheses showed Turkish participants reflected significantly
more care orientation than did U.S. participants which is consistent with Shweder et
al.’s (1990) ideas. However, Turkish participants also reflected significantly more
justice orientation than did U.S. participants, contrary to Shweder et al.’s expectations.
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This is a surprising result, given that the United States is a justice seeking culture
(Miller, 1994) and the most individualistic country in the world (Kozan & Ergin, 1998).
These findings can be said to be consistent with Shweder et al.’s claim that
collectivistic (non-Western) cultures reflect care reasoning or “duty-based” morality,
but in contradiction with their claim that justice reasoning or “rights-based” morality is
a characteristic of individualistic (Western) societies.
In modern Turkey, there are strong traditions based on care and responsibility
(Lyons, 1996). At the same time, there is a lack of equality, individual rights, and
freedoms. For this reason, even though Turkish people are historically care oriented,
they are very sensitive and responsive to issues related to justice. Also, during the last
century, the political leaders of modern Turkey set the Western culture as the model for
the country, which influenced the public significantly toward modernization, equality,
and individual rights, especially women’s rights. The author believes these factors
might explain high justice scores of the Turkish participants.
To summarize, the findings of this study support previous studies that indicate
individualistic concerns are also present in the thought and behavior of people in
collectivistic (non-Western) societies (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000). In fact, research shows
“self-interested goals and concerns with personal entitlements are part of the thinking
of the Balinese, Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese, and Japanese” (Turiel, 1998, p. 916).
Arab Druze people living in Israel have been found to “endorse individual freedoms
and rights even when in contradiction with status and hierarchy” (Turiel, 1998, p. 914)
as well as to endorse traditions and role distinctions. Research also shows “Americans
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do endorse rights and freedoms, which have been associated with individualism, but
they also subordinate freedoms to preventing harm, upholding traditions, asserting
community standards, and maintaining social order” (Turiel, 1998, p. 914).
In light of these research findings it can be said that the justice and care
orientations, or “rights-based” and “duty-based” moralities, can coexist strongly in
cultures, regardless of western – non-western, individualist – collectivist classifications.
As mentioned in the literature review, Gilligan (1982) claims justice and care
orientations are basically linked to gender. According to her, women predominantly use
the care-oriented moral reasoning, while men predominantly use the justice-oriented
moral reasoning. To better examine gender differences in moral orientation, additional
analyses were conducted. Results of t-test analyses for this sample indicated Turkish
and U.S. males did not exhibit significant differences in the justice and care
orientations. Results also indicated Turkish females exhibited significantly more care
orientation than justice orientation, while U.S. females did not exhibit significant
differences in the justice and care orientations (see Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15).
As mentioned before, previous studies on moral orientation yield little support
for the view that there is a generalized distinction between men and women in their
orientations (Colby & Damon, 1994). The results of this study can be said to support
these previous research findings, as Turkish males, U.S. males, and U.S. females
included in this study did not exhibit significant difference in the justice and care
orientations. Overall, these results indicate gender for the participants in this study is
not a significant factor in the justice and care orientations, but a combination of culture
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and gender can be significant. In other words, “the structure of the culture combined
with gender related factors may play important roles in shaping moral orientation”
(Lyons, 1996, p. 126).
Table 12
T-test results of justice and care orientations for Turkish males.
                       Group                  n         Mean         s.d.              df             t             p
Justice          Turkish males       66        68.24         8.59            65          -.329      .743
Care                                                       67.67         9.94
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
Table 13
T-test results of justice and care orientations for U.S. males.
                       Group                  n         Mean         s.d.              df             t             p
Justice          U.S. males            12        74.42       13.53            11          .458        .656
Care                                                       75.58      15.08
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
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Table 14
T-test results of justice and care orientations for Turkish females.
                       Group                   n         Mean         s.d.             df             t             p
Justice          Turkish females    125      64.14         7.82           124        -4.099    .000
Care                                                       60.26         9.05
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
Table 15
T-test results of justice and care orientations for U.S. females.
                       Group                   n         Mean         s.d.            df             t             p
Justice          U.S. females        109        68.59        9.32          108         -.736       .464
Care                                                       67.83       11.43
Note:  Lower values indicate higher levels.
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research
An insufficient number of U.S. male participants (n = 12) are included in this
study. Future research can duplicate the methods of this study using a more balanced
distribution of male and female university students.
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Compared to the Turkish participants, most of the U.S. participants had higher
family incomes and the drop out rates of the U.S. participants on the DIT were more
than those of Turkish participants. These factors may affect the results. Also, the
majority of the U.S. sample consists of students taking “human development” and
“parenting” classes which may be considered as non-random sampling. Similar can be
said for the Turkish sample, which consists of students from the departments of
Psychological Studies in Education, American Culture and Literature, and Foreign
Language Education.
Suggestions for Future Application
Morality includes humane caring, objective thinking, and determined action.
Individuals are expected to use these three elements of morality together in making
their moral decisions. All the models developed for moral education represent the
different ways “of thinking about the processes of caring, judging, and acting in an
educational setting” (Hersh et al., 1980, p. 7). Each model includes a theory which
answers the question of how individuals develop morally and a set of strategies for
promoting moral development.
Studies on moral reasoning and moral orientation can make a significant impact
on moral education. Results of such studies can be used in increasing the effectiveness
of existing moral education models equally on both genders. These results can also be
used in developing new moral education programs. Cross-cultural studies on moral
development may be especially important for moral education. Using such cross-
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cultural studies one can understand if existing moral education programs or models
work in all cultures and promote the same values cross-culturally.
The results of this study are specific to university students and cannot be
generalized to all ages. Moral education can be considered most effective at early ages;
therefore, a cross-cultural study on children’s moral reasoning can be more beneficial to
moral education than the results of this study. On the other hand, the findings of this
study can be used to improve the content of a moral education program offered to
university students.
Conclusion
The results of this study support the existence of postconventional reasoning as
defined by Kohlberg’s theory in Turkey as well as in Western cultures, contrary to
Shweder et al.’s (1990) claim. Between 1964 and 1976, Kohlberg found Turkish people
to be less morally advanced with respect to their American counterparts. The results of
this research contradict Kohlberg’s findings. Turkish participants were found to reflect
more postconventional reasoning, while U.S. participants were found to reflect more
conventional reasoning, particularly Stage 4 reasoning. One reason can be the fact that
education is controlled in this research. Another reason can be the modernization of
Turkey during the last few decades. This implies culture may have a significant effect
in moral decision-making.
Even though traditional Turkish culture is characterized as a group-oriented
culture reflecting collectivistic values (Phalet & Claeys, 1993), in today’s modern
Turkey, individuals are expected “to find and express their own individuality” (Lyons,
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1996, p. 135) and be aware of their individual rights. At the same time, they are also
expected to be aware of responsibility for family and community. Therefore, in today’s
Turkey, the ideal Turkish citizen is one who makes a balance between being a rational
modern citizen and being a caring person. This suggests Turkish people “while pushed
towards being separate, objective, and justice oriented are pushed also by the
communal nature of the culture towards reflection on relationship,” (Lyons, 1996, p.
135) care, and responsibility. Therefore, ideal modern Turkish people characteristics
which are expressed by university students can be said to be consistent with the
characteristics of Kohlberg’s postconventional level, which represents the integration of
the justice and care orientations (Spiecker, 1994).
Turkish females were found to exhibit significantly more care orientation than
justice orientation; however, U.S. males, U.S. females, and Turkish males did not
exhibit significant difference in the justice and care orientations, contrary to Gilligan’s
expectations. These findings suggest not gender alone, but a combination of culture and
gender may play an important role in shaping moral orientation. Turkish participants
were observed to reflect significantly more care orientation and more justice orientation
compared to U.S. participants. Overall, these results imply justice and care orientations





I am a student at the University of North Texas working on my master’s degree
in Counseling, Development and Higher Education. My research interest is cross-
cultural comparisons of reasoning skills of Turkish university students with that of
American counterparts.
My study does not deal with the individual answers of the participants, but
merely concerns with how the university students of these two cultures generally make
judgments about problems.
If you decide to participate in my study, you will be expected to complete two
questionnaires which deal with your knowledge, attitudes and opinions regarding a
variety of social issues. A 50-minute time period is usually enough for the participant to
complete each questionnaire.
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to
participate will not affect your relationship with your department. If you decide to
participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any
time without penalty.
Results of this project will not report the responses of any one individual, but
will utilize group averages and statistics. All data collected for this study become the
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property of the researcher. Any information that is obtained in connection with this
study will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission.
This will be the first study to examine differences and/or similarities between
the university students of these two cultures in terms of reasoning skills. Therefore, by
participating in this study you are contributing to the literature regarding cultural
differences. The only potential risk to participants in this project is the potential loss of
anonymity; however, this risk is extremely minimal as subject names will not appear on
any questionnaire.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me (Nilay Kuyel, [972-
475-3541]) or my university advisor (Rebecca J. Glover, [940-565-4876]). You will be
offered a copy of this consent form to keep.
Your signature indicates that you have read and understood the information
provided above, that you willingly agree to participate, that you may withdraw your
consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty, that you will receive
a copy of this form.
Signature of Participant                                                                                  Date
Signature of Investigator                                                                                Date
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Say n Kat l mc ,
        North Texas niversitesi’nin, “Dan şmanl k, İnsan Gelişimi ve Y ksek Eğitim
B l m ”nde y ksek lisans ğrencisiyim. Farkl  k lt rlerden gelen kişilerin, eşitli
sosyal olaylar karş s nda nas l fikir y r tt klerini incelemeye y nelik bir araşt rma
yapmaktay m.
        Bu araşt rman n temel amac , T rk ve Amerikan niversite ğrencilerinin, olaylar
karş s nda genel olarak nas l fikir y r tt klerini incelemektir. Bu araşt rmada sizden,
eşitli sosyal olaylara ilişkin bilgi, tutum ve g r şleri belirlemek amac yla haz rlanm ş
iki anketi doldurman z beklenmektedir. Bu anketler yabanc  kaynaklardan evrilmiştir.
Bu nedenle, zel isimler orijinal halleriyle b rak lm şt r. Sizden istenilen şey,
hikayelerdeki kahramanlar hangi isimde ve hangi k lt re mensup olursa olsun,
kendinizi onlar n yerine koyup, sizin kendi g r şlerinizi bildirmenizdir. Anketlerden
her biri yaklaş k 40 dakika s rmektedir. Bu araşt rmaya kat lmak, isteğe bağl d r.
        Bu projede, kat l mc lar n kimlikleri ve bireysel cevaplar  gizli kalacakt r.
Araşt rma sonunda, hi bir kat l mc n n bireysel cevaplar  hakk nda bilgi verilmeyecek;
elde edilen t m bilgiler, grup ortalamalar n  belirleme ve istatistik al şmalar  yapma
amac na y nelik olarak kullan lacakt r.
        Bu al şma, T rk ve Amerikan k lt rlerine mensup niversite ğrencilerini “fikir
y r tme becerileri” a s ndan inceleyen yeni bir araşt rmad r. Bu nedenle, bu al şmaya
kat lmakla, k lt rel farkl l klara ilişkin literat re katk da bulunmaktas n z. T rkiye’de
Hacettepe, Ankara ve Orta Doğu Teknik niversitesi ğrencileri; Amerika’da ise,
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North Texas niversitesi ğrencileri araşt rmaya dahil edilmiştir. Anketler size
uyguland ğ  şu s ralar, belli bir grup Amerikal  ğrenci zerinde de uygulanmaktad r.
Araşt rma sonu lar , proje tamamland ktan sonra ( n m zdeki sonbaharda) size de
bildirilecektir.
        G r şlerinizi i tenlikle belirtmeniz, araşt rman n g venilirliği a s ndan b y k bir
nem taş maktad r. Buna zen g stereceğiniz ve araşt rmaya katk da bulunacağ n z i in
ok teşekk r ederim.
        Bu araşt rmaya y nelik sorular n z olursa, beni veya dan şman m  aramaktan
ekinmeyin.
Nilay zkan K yel (Araşt rmac ):              Do . Dr. Rebecca J. Glover (Araşt rma
                                                                    Dan şman ):
        Tel: (972) 475-3541                                      Tel: (940) 565-4876
        Aşağ daki imzan z, yukar da verilen bilgiyi okuduğunuzu ve araşt rmaya isteyerek
kat ld ğ n z  g stermektedir.
Kat l mc n n imzas                                                                         Tarih
Araşt rmac n n imzas                                                                    Tarih
       Bu proje, kat l mc lar n korunmas  amac yla, North Texas niversitesi Komitesi
taraf ndan incelenmiş ve onaylanm şt r. [Tel: (940) 565-3940]
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Demographic Questionnaire
Please complete the information below:
Major:___________________________
Please indicate the number of credit hours you have completed:______________
Please circle your classification:      Freshman       Sophomore        Junior         Senior
Age:                                                 Birthdate:_____________
Gender (circle one):  Female           Male
Number of siblings:___________
Where are you from?  State:                                                City:
         Town:
Marital status (circle one):   Married       Single       Divorced        Widowed
Family income (yearly):$____________
Father’s level of education (circle highest grad completed):
1       2        3             4            5             6            7           8            9         10       11       12
completed some college
completed a Bachelors degree
completed some graduate work
completed a Masters degree
completed a doctoral degree (PhD, EdD, MD, etc.)
Father’s occupation:______________________
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Mother’s level of education (circle highest grad completed):
1         2          3          4          5          6          7           8          9         10          11           12
completed some college
completed a Bachelors degree
completed some graduate work
completed a Masters degree
completed a doctoral degree (PhD, EdD, MD, etc.)
Mother’s occupation:______________________
Parents’ marital status:   Never married       Married        Divorced         Widowed










Kardeş say s :_______________________________________________________
Yurdun hangi kesiminden geliyorsunuz? (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp
işareti koyunuz.)
Şehir:        Kasaba:         K y:
B lge ad :____________________________________________________
Medeni durum: (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp  işareti koyunuz)
Evli:          Bekar:            Boşanm ş:          Dul:
Ailenin ayl k geliri: (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp  işareti koyunuz.)
Beşy z milyonun alt :
Beşy z milyon bir bu uk milyar aras :
Bir bu uk milyar n st :
Baban z n eğitim durumu: (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp  işareti koyunuz.)




Annenizin eğitim durumu: (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp  işareti koyunuz.)
İlk:         Orta:          Lise:        niversite:         Y ksek lisans:
Annenizin
mesleği:____________________________________________________________
Annenizle baban z n medeni durumu: (Aşağ daki uygun se eneğin yan na arp  işareti
koyunuz.)
Evli:        Boşanm ş:         Dul:
Annenizle baban z boşand  ise ya da ikisinden biri dul ise, boşand klar nda ya da
eşlerden biri dul kald ğ nda  ka  yaş ndayd n z?___________________________
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Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test may be obtained from:
The Center for the Study of Ethical Development
University of Minnesota
206-A Burton Hall
178 Pillsbury Drive SE
Minneapolis, MN  55455
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Measurement of Moral Orientation
The Measurement of Moral Orientation may be obtained from:
Dr. Deborah Liddell
Associate Professor
Division of Counseling, Rehabilitation, and Student Development
The University of Iowa
N 364 Lindquist Center




Stage 1:    Fear of authority and avoidance of punishment are reasons for behaving
     morally.
Stage 2:    Satisfying personal needs determines moral choice.
Stage 3:    Maintaining the affection and approval of friends and relatives motivates
                 good behavior.
Stage 4:    A duty to uphold laws and rules for their own sake justifies moral
     conformity.
Stage 5A: focuses on organizing a society by appealing to consensus-producing
    procedures (such as abiding by majority vote), insisting on due process, and
                 safeguarding minimal basic rights.
Stage 5B: focuses on organizing social arrangements and relationships in terms of
    intuitively appealing ideals.
Stage 6:    Abstract universal principles (universal principles of justice: the equality of
    human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual
    persons) that are valid for all humanity guide moral decision-making.
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